When Belief Becomes False Memory: A Processing Account

当信念变成虚假记忆时：处理帐户

• 批准号: 6671456
• 负责人: Daniel M. Bernstein
• 金额: $ 4.64万
• 依托单位: UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 财政年份: 2002
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2002-07-01 至 2004-06-30
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://reporter.nih.gov/project-details/6671456
• 关键词: association learning; attribution; behavioral /social science research tag; belief; clinical research; cognition; dreams; experience; human subject; imagination; memory; memory disorders; mental process; postdoctoral investigator

DESCRIPTION (provided by applicant): Memory works most of the time. Unfortunately, memory also fails us at times. While it is now virtually uncontested that false memories can and do occur, it is unclear exactly how and why they emerge. Mazzoni, Loftus and Kirsch (2001) have recently proposed a three-step model for the development of false memories. According to the model, 1) an event must be seen as plausible; 2) one must obtain a personal belief that the event likely occurred to him/her; and 3) one must interpret thoughts and fantasies about the event as memories. The proposed work explores how belief in a plausible (e.g., bitten by a snake) or implausible (e.g., shaking hand with the President) general topic can be enhanced and then transformed into a personal memory. Six experiments are proposed in which subjects come to believe or disbelieve that they have experienced a variety of events as children, based on the way in which they process those events. It is hypothesized that the probability that an individual comes to believe that an event occurred in his/her past depends on the ease with which the event is initially processed or experienced. Moreover, it is proposed that errors in attribution are responsible for false memory. Finally, it is suggested that a single, general process underlies both belief and autobiographical memory. The proposed work will help clarify the relationship between belief and memory, thereby delineating some of the mechanisms responsible for false memory.

描述(申请人提供)：记忆在大多数情况下都是有效的。 不幸的是，记忆有时也会让我们失手。虽然它现在几乎是 毫无疑问，错误记忆可以而且确实会发生，目前还不清楚错误记忆是如何发生的 为什么它们会出现。Mazzoni，Loftus和Kirsch(2001)最近提出了一个 错误记忆发展的三步模型。根据该模型， 1)一件事必须被认为是可信的；2)一个人必须有个人的信念 事件很可能发生在他/她身上；以及3)一个人必须解释他/她的想法 以及对这一事件的幻想作为回忆。这项拟议的工作探索了 相信可信的(例如，被蛇咬了)或不可信的(例如，颤抖 与总统携手)一般性主题可以得到加强，然后转化 变成了个人记忆。提出了六个实验，在这些实验中，受试者 相信或不相信他们经历了各种各样的事件 儿童，基于他们处理这些事件的方式。它是 假设一个人开始相信一个 他/她过去发生的事件取决于事件发生的容易程度 最初处理过或经历过的。此外，还建议， 归因是错误记忆的原因。最后，有人建议，一个 单一的、一般的过程既是信仰的基础，也是自传记忆的基础。这个 拟议的工作将有助于澄清信仰和记忆之间的关系， 从而描绘了导致错误记忆的一些机制。

项目成果

The revelation effect for autobiographical memory: a mixture-model analysis.

自传体记忆的启示效应：混合模型分析。

• DOI: 10.3758/pbr.16.3.463
• 发表时间: 2009
• 期刊: Psychonomic bulletin & review
• 影响因子: 3.5
• 作者: Bernstein,DanielM;Rudd,MichaelE;Erdfelder,Edgar;Godfrey,Ryan;Loftus,ElizabethF
• 通讯作者: Loftus,ElizabethF

Conditions affecting the revelation effect for autobiographical memory.

影响自传体记忆启示效果的条件。

• DOI: 10.3758/bf03195838
• 发表时间: 2004
• 期刊: Memory & cognition
• 影响因子: 2.4
• 作者: Bernstein,DanielM;Godfrey,RyanD;Davison,Arienne;Loftus,ElizabethF
• 通讯作者: Loftus,ElizabethF