Trials and Penal Sanctions by Non-State Armed Groups

强加于非国家武装团体的国际人道主义准则的范围在法律和实践上仍然不发达。不发达现象日益明显的一个领域是国家行政当局的司法工作。我提出的研究分析了通过国家行政当局建立法院和其他司法结构的法律框架。在武装冲突时期，国家当局往往失去有效管理某些领土的能力，包括维持其司法系统的能力。这一法律和体制空白往往是通过控制有关领土的叛乱运动建立的新机构来填补的。实际上，几乎所有武装团体都建立了某种形式的法治和司法制度，当代的例子包括叙利亚的库尔德团体和斯里兰卡的泰米尔猛虎组织。通常情况下，这些机构所在领土所在的国家强烈反对叛乱分子设立法院的想法，并对将其决定定性为“法律”提出异议。国际人道主义法和人权法对武装冲突中的司法程序规定了一套实质性的限制。日内瓦四公约和习惯国际法要求法院独立和不偏不倚，依法设立，并为被告提供基本的公平审判保障。在宣判时不遵守这些基本要求甚至可能构成战争罪。因此，第一个研究问题是，这些限制在多大程度上适用于非SAG，以及这些群体如何遵守这些限制。这是我目前正试图在我的MPhil研究中回答的一个问题，DPhil将以此为基础。如果武装团体不可能通过法院实施刑事制裁，那么在国家无法执法的地区，严重违反国际人道主义法的犯罪者可能逍遥法外。然而，如果这些法院本身不是按照国际法设立的，这将损害它们对国际人道主义法的执行和实施可能产生的任何积极影响。更进一步，第二个研究问题将分析是否存在国际法实际上规定国家安全援助机构有义务进行刑事诉讼的情况。国际人道主义法，特别是《日内瓦四公约》及其附加议定书要求国家安全援助小组执行其规定，并通过纪律处分或刑事行动制裁犯罪者。此外，国际刑法中的指挥责任理论规定，如果叛军指挥官希望避免为其下属的行为承担刑事责任，他们有义务惩罚肇事者。最后，国际人权法对叛乱组织的适用仍然存在争议，这可能表明这些组织有义务在其控制的领土上维持公共秩序。如果没有某种形式的司法结构，所有这些任务似乎都不可能完成。这一研究问题与第一个问题有内在联系：如果国家安全援助小组有义务进行刑事诉讼，还必须有办法在不违反其他国际法准则的情况下履行这一义务。最后，第三个研究问题涉及各国与国家安全援助小组法庭的接触和承认。例如，如果被反叛法院正式定罪的个人可能必须面临国家法院的第二次审判，或者反过来，这种定罪是否可以作为通过国家机构进行监禁的法律依据。它将探讨当代国家在国际论坛上对反叛司法制度的做法，以及此类法院在国内或国际判例中得到承认的情况。

The scope of international humanitarian norms imposed on non-state armed groups (NSAGs) still remains underdeveloped in law and practice. One field where this underdevelopment has become increasingly evident is the administration of justice by NSAGs. My proposed research analyses the legal framework for the establishment of courts and other judicial structures through NSAGs. In times of armed conflict state authorities often lose the ability to effectively govern certain territories, including the maintenance of their judicial systems. This legal and institutional void is often filled through new institutions established by the insurgent movements in control of the territory concerned. In practice, almost all armed groups develop some form of rule of law and a system for the administration of justice, with contemporary examples ranging from Kurdish groups in Syria to the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka. Usually, states on whose territory these institutions are based fiercely object to the idea of insurgents setting up courts, a power so central to state sovereignty, and dispute the characterization of their decisions as 'law'. International humanitarian law and human rights law provide for a substantial set of restrictions to judicial proceedings in armed conflict. The Geneva Conventions and customary international law require courts to be independent and impartial, established by law and providing the accused with fundamental fair trial guarantees. Not complying with these essential requirements while passing sentences can even constitute a war crime. The first research question is, therefore, to what extent these restrictions apply to NSAGs and how these groups can comply with them. This is a question I am currently trying to answer in my MPhil research, which the DPhil will build upon. If armed groups had no possibility to impose penal sanctions through courts, perpetrators of serious violations of International Humanitarian Law might go unpunished in areas where the State is unable to enforce the law. However, if these courts are not set up in compliance with international law themselves, this would compromise any positive effect they might have on the enforcement and implementation of international humanitarian law. Going a step further, the second research question will analyse whether there are circumstances in which international law actually imposes an obligation on NSAGs to conduct penal proceedings. NSAGs are required by international humanitarian law, in particular the Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols, to implement its provisions and sanction perpetrators either through disciplinary or penal action. In addition, the doctrine of command responsibility in international criminal law imposes a duty onto rebel commanders to punish perpetrators if they want to avoid being held criminally responsible for the actions of their subordinates. Finally, the still controversial application of international human rights law to insurgent groups might suggest that these groups are under an obligation to maintain public order in the territories they control. All these tasks seem impossible to fulfil without some form of judicial structures. This research question is inherently linked with the first: if NSAGs are under an obligation to conduct penal proceedings there must also be a way to discharge that obligation without violation of other norms of international law.Finally, the third research question looks at the engagement with and recognition of NSAG courts by States. For example, if an individual properly convicted by a rebel court might have to face a second trial by State courts or, the other way around, whether such conviction might serve as a legal basis for imprisonment through State institutions. It will look at contemporary state practice towards rebel judicial systems in international fora and instances where such courts have been recognized in domestic or international jurisprudence.