The value of choice under social norms

尽管性别平等有所改善，但全球妇女仍然面临歧视。政治学家和发展经济学家之间越来越多的共识是，女性获得权力或做出选择的能力的最主要障碍之一是性别规范。女权主义哲学家也认同这一观点，他们认为，一个自由主义项目必须考虑到这些规范的基本影响。然而，契约主义——规范伦理学的主导方法——尽管它关注个人选择，但这些发现并未改变。通过将契约主义思想和女权主义理论中发展起来的观点结合起来，我的项目旨在填补道德哲学中的这一重大空白。我的研究的目的也是提供相关的结果，政治科学家有志制定公共政策，是有效的在一个多样化的人口的所有部分。契约主义的核心人物t·m·斯坎伦（T. M. Scanlon）没有讨论他的选择价值观是否能够处理社会规范。根据斯坎伦的说法，对道德原则的抱怨的强度部分取决于一个人的选择：如果她的处境是她自己选择的结果，并且如果原则给了她一个通常会让人们过得很好的选择，那么一个人对该原则把她置于何种境地负有实质性的责任。她已经受够了，她对这一原则的抱怨也减弱了。例如，如果我们假设人们普遍重视一个功能良好的身体，那么一个告诉我们不健康饮食的危险，并以合理的价格提供健康食品的原则，就提供了一个普遍有价值的机会。选择吃得不充分的人对营养不良负有重大责任。然而，对于一个已经内化了“越瘦越好”的性别规范的女性来说，这个通常很有价值的机会似乎就不那么有价值了。因此，问题在于，正如我将要论证的那样，斯坎伦把每个有机会的人都描绘成被置于无法抱怨的环境中，即使他们最终因此受到伤害。为了提供一个在应用于现实世界时不会产生如此难以置信的影响的解释，我的项目由两个部分组成，每个部分都围绕一个研究问题：1。在压迫性的社会规范下，选择的价值是什么？2. 契约主义应该如何适应特殊性？第一部分将讨论性别规范对人们选择机会的影响。我打算研究如何将这种影响概念化，并建立一个契约主义框架，在这个框架中，选择价值的变化可以被解释。Bicchieri的观点在发展研究领域得到广泛认同，我们遵循社会规范不是因为我们认为从长远来看，它们会帮助我们避免伤害或不利，而是因为我们期望别人遵循这些规范，而别人也期望我们遵循这些规范。因此，社会规范只能通过集体期望的改变来改变——我们不能假设仅仅告诉人们健康饮食的好处就足以让他们这样做。在我的研究中，关于社会规范的实证和理论发现将作为斯坎伦理论的补充。我的项目的第二部分将建立在第一部分的发现之上，包括对契约主义使用一般原因的女权主义分析。我的项目目的不是要抛弃泛化，而是要检验契约主义中所包含的限制是否恰当。根据罗尔斯的反思性均衡方法，我打算论证，如果契约主义在应用于非理想环境时产生了难以置信的影响，我们必须认为它不适合它的目的。

Despite improvements in gender equality, women continuously face discrimination globally. There is a growing consensus among political scientists and development economists that one of the most central hinders to women's empowerment, or ability to make choices, is gender norms. This view is shared by feminist philosophers, who argue that a liberal project must take the fundamental effects of such norms into account. However, contractualism - the dominant approach in normative ethics - does despite its focus on individual choice remain unchanged by these findings. By bringing together contractualist thought and ideas developed in feminist theory, my project aims to fill this significant gap in moral philosophy. The purpose of my research is also to provide results relevant to political scientists aspiring to formulate public policy that is effective in all parts of a diversified population. T. M. Scanlon, who is central to contractualism, does not discuss whether his Value of Choice view is capable of handling social norms. According to Scanlon, the strength of a complaint against a moral principle is partly determined by one's choices: a person is substantively responsible for being in the position the principle puts her in if her situation is a result of her own choosing, and if the principle gave her an option that generally would lead people to fare well. Enough has then been done for her, and her complaint against the principle is weakened.If we, for instance, assume that people generally value a well-functioning body, a principle that informs us about the dangers involved in eating unhealthily, and that offers healthy food at reasonable prices, provides a generally valuable opportunity. A person who chooses to eat inadequately is substantively responsible for becoming malnourished. However, for a woman who has internalised a gender norm prescribing that women are better the thinner they are, this generally valuable opportunity appears to be less valuable. Therefore, it is problematic that, as I will argue, Scanlon portrays everyone who has had that opportunity as having been put in circumstances about which they cannot complain, even if they end up harmed as a result of them. Aiming at providing an account that does not have such implausible implications when applied to the real world, my project consists of two parts, which each is centred around a research question: 1. What is the value of choosing under oppressive social norms? 2. How should contractualism accommodate particularities? The first part will discuss the effect of gender norms on people's opportunities to choose. I intend to examine how such effects can be conceptualised, and to produce a contractualist framework where the alterations of the value of choice can be accounted for. On Bicchieri's view, which is widely shared in the field of development studies, we follow social norms not because we think they will help us avoid harm or disadvantage in the long run, but because we have expectations that others follow them, and that others expect us to follow them. Therefore, social norms can only be changed through a collective change in expectations - we cannot assume that merely informing people of the perks involved in eating healthily will suffice to make them do so. In my research, the empirical and theoretical findings on social norms will serve as additional input to Scanlon's theory. The second part of my project will build on the findings of the first and consist in a feminist analysis of contractualism's use of generic reasons. My project aims not at discarding generalisation, but to examine whether the restrictions built into contractualism are the appropriate ones. I intend to argue, in line with Rawls' reflective equilibrium method, that if contractualism results in implausible implications when applied to non-ideal circumstances, we must deem it unsuitable for its purpose.