The value of choice under social norms

社会规范下的选择价值

• 批准号: 2268957
• 金额: --
• 依托单位: University of Oxford
• 依托单位国家: 英国
• 项目类别: Studentship
• 财政年份: 2019
• 资助国家: 英国
• 起止时间: 2019 至 无数据
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://gtr.ukri.org/projects?ref=studentship-2268957
• 关键词: value; choice; under; social; norms

Despite improvements in gender equality, women continuously face discrimination globally. There is a growing consensus among political scientists and development economists that one of the most central hinders to women's empowerment, or ability to make choices, is gender norms. This view is shared by feminist philosophers, who argue that a liberal project must take the fundamental effects of such norms into account. However, contractualism - the dominant approach in normative ethics - does despite its focus on individual choice remain unchanged by these findings. By bringing together contractualist thought and ideas developed in feminist theory, my project aims to fill this significant gap in moral philosophy. The purpose of my research is also to provide results relevant to political scientists aspiring to formulate public policy that is effective in all parts of a diversified population. T. M. Scanlon, who is central to contractualism, does not discuss whether his Value of Choice view is capable of handling social norms. According to Scanlon, the strength of a complaint against a moral principle is partly determined by one's choices: a person is substantively responsible for being in the position the principle puts her in if her situation is a result of her own choosing, and if the principle gave her an option that generally would lead people to fare well. Enough has then been done for her, and her complaint against the principle is weakened.If we, for instance, assume that people generally value a well-functioning body, a principle that informs us about the dangers involved in eating unhealthily, and that offers healthy food at reasonable prices, provides a generally valuable opportunity. A person who chooses to eat inadequately is substantively responsible for becoming malnourished. However, for a woman who has internalised a gender norm prescribing that women are better the thinner they are, this generally valuable opportunity appears to be less valuable. Therefore, it is problematic that, as I will argue, Scanlon portrays everyone who has had that opportunity as having been put in circumstances about which they cannot complain, even if they end up harmed as a result of them. Aiming at providing an account that does not have such implausible implications when applied to the real world, my project consists of two parts, which each is centred around a research question: 1. What is the value of choosing under oppressive social norms? 2. How should contractualism accommodate particularities? The first part will discuss the effect of gender norms on people's opportunities to choose. I intend to examine how such effects can be conceptualised, and to produce a contractualist framework where the alterations of the value of choice can be accounted for. On Bicchieri's view, which is widely shared in the field of development studies, we follow social norms not because we think they will help us avoid harm or disadvantage in the long run, but because we have expectations that others follow them, and that others expect us to follow them. Therefore, social norms can only be changed through a collective change in expectations - we cannot assume that merely informing people of the perks involved in eating healthily will suffice to make them do so. In my research, the empirical and theoretical findings on social norms will serve as additional input to Scanlon's theory. The second part of my project will build on the findings of the first and consist in a feminist analysis of contractualism's use of generic reasons. My project aims not at discarding generalisation, but to examine whether the restrictions built into contractualism are the appropriate ones. I intend to argue, in line with Rawls' reflective equilibrium method, that if contractualism results in implausible implications when applied to non-ideal circumstances, we must deem it unsuitable for its purpose.

尽管性别平等有所改善，但妇女在全球范围内继续面临歧视。政治学家和发展经济学家越来越多地达成共识，认为性别规范是赋予妇女权力或妇女作出选择的能力的最主要障碍之一。女权主义哲学家也持这种观点，他们认为自由主义的项目必须考虑到这些规范的基本影响。然而，契约主义-规范伦理学中的主导方法-尽管其重点是个人选择，这些发现仍然没有改变。通过将契约主义思想和女权主义理论中的思想结合起来，我的项目旨在填补道德哲学中的这一重大空白。我的研究的目的也是提供相关的政治科学家有志于制定公共政策，是有效的，在一个多元化的人口的所有部分的结果。T. M.斯坎伦是契约主义的核心，他没有讨论他的选择价值观是否能够处理社会规范。根据斯坎伦的说法，对道德原则的抱怨的强度部分取决于一个人的选择：如果一个人的处境是她自己选择的结果，并且如果原则给了她一个通常会导致人们过得很好的选择，那么这个人对原则让她处于的境地负有实质性责任。如果我们假设人们普遍重视一个功能良好的身体，那么，一个告诉我们不健康饮食的危险，并以合理价格提供健康食品的原则，就提供了一个普遍有价值的机会。一个选择吃得不饱的人要对营养不良负实质性责任。然而，对于一个已经内化了性别规范的女性来说，女性越瘦越好，这个通常有价值的机会似乎不那么有价值。因此，有问题的是，正如我将要论证的那样，斯坎伦把每一个有机会的人描绘成处于他们不能抱怨的环境中，即使他们最终会因此受到伤害。为了提供一个在应用于真实的世界时不会产生这种难以置信的影响的解释，我的项目包括两个部分，每个部分都围绕着一个研究问题：1。在压迫性的社会规范下，选择的价值是什么？2.契约主义应如何适应特殊性？第一部分将讨论性别规范对人们选择机会的影响。我打算研究如何将这种影响概念化，并提出一个契约主义框架，在这个框架中，可以解释选择价值的变化。Bicchieri的观点在发展研究领域得到了广泛的认同，我们遵循社会规范并不是因为我们认为从长远来看它们会帮助我们避免伤害或劣势，而是因为我们期望别人遵循它们，而别人也期望我们遵循它们。因此，社会规范只能通过期望的集体变化来改变--我们不能假设仅仅告诉人们健康饮食的好处就足以让他们这样做。在我的研究中，关于社会规范的经验和理论发现将作为对斯坎伦理论的补充。 我的项目的第二部分将建立在第一部分的研究结果，并包括在契约主义的使用一般原因的女权主义分析。我的项目的目的不是放弃概括，而是检查契约主义中的限制是否是适当的。根据罗尔斯的反思平衡方法，我打算论证，如果契约主义在应用于非理想环境时导致了难以置信的含义，我们必须认为它不适合其目的。