Do Trading Mechanisms Offer a More Effective Approach to Institutional Investor Engagement than the Current Reliance on Conversation-based Engagement

一项全面的调查和分析，在英国公司管理监管制度中，交易机制是否提供了一种更有效的机构投资者参与方式，而不是目前依赖于基于对话的参与（投资者“声音”）。为当前围绕机构投资者行动主义的辩论做出贡献；2 .审查《管理守则》的有效性及其对投资者“声音”的依赖；3 .更清楚地了解贸易机制在管理方面所起的作用；确保英国的机构投资者不会失去影响被投资对象的环境、社会和治理政策的能力；and5。设计及建议进一步改革本守则。文献综述综述将包括对规范的深入分析，描述、总结和批判性地评估有关其有效性和弱点的相关文献。此外，将评估有关“股东行动主义”的文献，以总结有效管理的重要性。此外，还将审议关于利用贸易机制作为管理办法的相关文献。此外，关于机构投资者参与某些类型的交易的文献将与此类活动的潜在利益一起进行审查。定量研究为了准确地调查投资者的声音在多大程度上优于使用交易机制作为管理方法，有必要进行实证研究。这将涉及创建一个包含“特定投资事件”、“特定投资者”声音“参与事件”和随后文本“战略治理变化”信息的数据集。每个“投资事件”和“声音”事件将与“战略治理变革”相匹配（如果发生的话），以便评估每种参与方法的影响。此类事件的一个例子是，当时的玛莎百货（Marks and Spencer plc）首席执行官斯图尔特•罗斯（Stuart Rose）决定同时担任董事会主席和首席执行官，这违反了英国联合法典的规定。各种机构投资者公开表达了不满。这些数据将从多个来源收集，例如机构投资者根据守则更新要求所披露的信息、负责任投资原则报告、标准普尔资本IQ和标准普尔SNL。研究问题本项目将涉及以下问题的考虑：1。重新制定的《守则》在多大程度上解决了在前一次迭代中突出的弱点？b.《守则》的限制是什么？《准则》的应用是否存在漏洞？2 .通过投资者的“声音”进行参与是本准则应该提倡的一种方法吗？也就是说，通过投资者的“声音”进行“股东行动主义”的想法是值得努力的吗？在机构投资者采用的准则方法中，对投资者“声音”的依赖程度有多深？机构投资者在其管理方法中使用交易机制的程度如何？交易机制如何能提供一种比目前依赖投资者“声音”更有效的管理方式？该项目将以独特的方式为机构投资者行动主义领域的学术研究做出贡献，通过研究交易机制作为一种替代的、被低估的管理方法。将详细审查《守则》的效力，并确定若干改革建议，以便让基于市场的投资者参与在《守则》中发挥更积极的作用，从而对环境、社会和治理政策进行更有效的监督，并增强其影响力。

A comprehensive investigation and analysis of whether trading mechanisms offer a more effective approach to institutional investor engagement than the current reliance on conversation-based engagement (investor 'voice') within the UK's regulatory regime for corporate stewardship.Aims1.To contribute to the current debate surrounding institutional investor activism;2.To scrutinize the effectiveness of the Stewardship Code and its reliance on investor 'voice';3.To develop a clearer understanding of the role played by trading mechanisms in stewardship;4.To ensure that UK-based institutional investors do not lose their ability to influence the environmental, social and governance policies of investees; and5.To devise and propose further reform of the Code.MethodologyLiterature ReviewThis review will involve an in-depth analysis of the Code that will describe, summarise, and critically evaluate the relevant literature concerning its effectiveness and weaknesses. Additionally, the literature concerning 'shareholder activism' will be evaluated in order to summarise the importance of effective stewardship. Furthermore, the relevant literature on the use of trading mechanisms as an approach to stewardship will be considered. Moreover, the literature on institutional investors engaging in certain types of trading will be examined along with the potential benefits of such activity.Quantitative ResearchTo accurately investigate the extent to which investor voice is privileged over the use of trading mechanisms as an approach to stewardship, an empirical study will be necessary. This will involve the creation of a dataset containing information on 'specific investment events', 'specific investor 'voice' engagement events' and subsequent textual 'strategic governance change.' Each 'investment event' and 'voice' event will be matched to a 'strategic governance change' if one occurred, in order to assess the impact of each method of engagement. An example of such an event would be when Stuart Rose, the then CEO of Marks and Spencer plc, decided to take on the role of Chairman of the Board, as well as CEO, contrary to the provisions of the UK Combined Code. Various institutional investors publicly announced their discontent. This data will be collected from a number of sources, such as the disclosures of institutional investors under the Codes updated requirements, the Principles for Responsible Investment reports , S&P Capital IQ and S&P SNL.Research QuestionsThis project will involve the consideration of the following questions:1.To what extent has the re-formulated Code addressed the weaknesses that were highlighted in the previous iteration?a.What are the Code's limitations?b.Are there gaps in the Code's application?2.Is engagement via investor 'voice' an approach that should be promoted by the Code, i.e. is the idea of 'shareholder activism' via investor 'voice' a worthwhile endeavour?3.How deep does reliance on investor 'voice' run in the approach to the Code adopted by institutional investors?4.To what extent are trading mechanisms used by institutional investors in their approach to stewardship?5.How might trading mechanisms provide a more fruitful approach to stewardship than the current reliance on investor 'voice'?OutcomesThis project will contribute to scholarship in the area of institutional investor activism in a unique way by examining trading mechanisms as an alternative and underappreciated approach to stewardship. The effectiveness of the Code will be examined in detail and a number of proposals for reform will be defined so that market-based investor engagement plays a more active role within the Code, resulting in more effective oversight and enhanced influence concerning environmental, social and governance policies.