Autonomy, Adaptive Preferences & Pornography

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While there seems to be a consensus among feminist theorists that oppression hinders an agent's psychological and social conditions for autonomy, there remains a divide over why, under which conditions and to what extent. A feminist hard-case bringing this problem to light is that of adaptive preferences: that is, preferences that are subconsciously formed to reduce feelings of cognitive dissonance that come from unsatisfied desires.The aim of my research is to assess under what conditions adaptive preferences are in fact compatible with autonomy, and why. In particular, a case that has inspired my thesis is that of whether women who chose to star in pornography do so autonomously, even if it arguably contributes to their own subjugation. This question, posed by concerned feminist thinkers like Friedman, highlights key areas of philosophical debate over pornography, but has been left relatively untouched. Because of this, I believe such an area of research would be an original contribution to the ongoing philosophical and political debate over whether pornography can be considered feminist or liberating, as well as the wider debate of what precisely constitutes an autonomous choice. If the context in which the decision to star in pornography is made in is one of oppression, then such oppressive systems may affect the critical reflection which one can use to make a genuine choice. Does this then impede us from being autonomous? Such questions are pertinent to today's society where the accessibility of pornography has pushed for studies over its impact on its producers, consumers, wider society alike; especially as feminists have become more aware of patriarchal structures, and look to how best to tackle them. It is my belief that the way to answer these questions is through feminist critique and philosophical analysis of the arguments for and against adaptive preferences. Elster, for example, takes a procedural approach, arguing that adaptive preferences hinder autonomy because they are formed erroneously. I will argue that the distinction Elster makes between adaptive and legitimate preference formation falls apart when we consider that every agent is a product of their socialisation, not just the oppressed. Christman has sought to counter this problem by suggesting that such procedural approaches should focus on the history of how desires that determine actions come about: if a minimally rational agent would not object were she present at the point of desire formation, then the choices that follow from her desires are indeed her own. Yet, the content-neutral nature of Elster and Christman's approaches is also their greatest weakness as it falls prey to the problem of manipulation. I argue that even Christman's approach is not able to side-step this problem because it is unable to account for the oppressive norms so deeply ingrained in marginalised agents that lead to the agents themselves not objecting to oppressive desires being formed.Because of this, my aim is to build a procedural account of autonomy that does not fall prey to the problem of manipulation. I will draw from contrasting approaches to autonomy to highlight why we can argue that adaptive preferences are autonomous in their own right: Namely, 'degrees of autonomy' approaches such as Garnett's, suggest that an agent can choose to be autonomously non-autonomous - that is, while agents can lack first-order autonomy, they can still be seen as having second-order autonomy. With these underpinning ideas in mind, my aim is to defend the claim that adaptive preferences can be compatible with autonomy under procedural accounts. Ultimately, shedding light on the question of whether women are able to autonomously choose to star in pornography even if it contributes to their own subjugation. As well as contributing to the wider debates of whether pornography can be feminist, and what constitutes an autonomous choice.