Formulating a Probabilistic Argument from Divine Hiddenness and Seeking Empirically Informed Solutions

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This project will focus on an objection to belief in God called the Argument from Divine Hiddenness (Schellenberg, 1993), which has now become the leading philosophical objection to God's existence in contemporary philosophy of religion. My work will seek to enlarge the discussion on this topic by looking at how the Argument from Divine Hiddenness can be reformulated using probabilistic reasoning, rather than deductive reasoning (Drange, 1993; Schellenberg, 2007, 2015). While this type of approach has been applied to and enhanced discussion of other arguments against God's existence, such as the Argument from Evil (Draper, 1989, 2011; Tooley, 1991, 2019; Rowe, 1979), virtually no work of this type has been applied to the Argument from Divine Hiddenness (Maitzen, 2006). Given increasing awareness of the unique contribution that Divine Hiddenness makes beyond the Argument from Evil (Anderson, forthcoming), my work will remedy this lack of attention on Divine Hiddenness by presenting a new probabilistic Argument from Divine Hiddenness.In addition, I will be using the tools and findings of epistemology, psychology of religion, and cognitive science of religion to explore potential solutions to this new argument, focusing primarily on non-culpable ways in which individuals might miss or fail to have available evidence. In epistemology, this will be on whether providing evidence to x entails that x will be in receipt of the evidence (Anderson, 2017, 2018). In psychology of religion, I will look at how types of biased reasoning bear on the question of belief in God along with how differences in information processing influences evidence sets. (Shenhav, Rand, and Greene, 2012; Lobato et al., 2020). And finally, in cognitive science of religion I will focus on the alleged naturalness of religious belief (Mccauley, 2011) and the implications this has for Divine Hiddenness.While my research will be methodologically innovative by, at least in part, relying on empirically informed data, I will still be using the methodology of contemporary analytical philosophers: conceptual analysis. Beyond moving conversation on Divine Hiddenness away from its current deadlock in the literature towards more fruitful dialogue, my research in epistemology and psychology of religion, for example, will have far-reaching implications to domains such as the legal system. Understanding how biases operate and how different individuals or groups may process evidence is a crucial component to reform policies concerning court proceedings and jury trials. Moreover, my research in the cognitive science of religion will explore some of the evolutionary underpinnings of religious belief. Exploring the cognitive mechanisms that give rise to religiosity can, for example, help sociologists understand and predictfactors affecting social change.