What Else Might We Learn from the Murderer? Towards a Kantian Ethics of Testimony

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ContextKant thinks it is always wrong to lie. This is often considered something of an overreaction. Would-be murderers notwithstanding, however, Kant's account of lying presents a story about the moral character of testimony that is worth taking seriously. My intended research concerns how this picture can be extended and used to theorise about further normative questions in the epistemology of testimony.Existing work on this topic from, e.g., Alix Cohen (2014) and Seana Shiffrin (2014), focusses on the distinctiveness of lying on the Kantian picture. By contrast, my project identifies an important and as yet under-theorised connection between lying, and other cases where the cooperation required for successful speech is wrongfully undermined. For instance: i) Deception without lying, and 'bald-faced' lying, which does not deceive. ii) Testimonial injustice, where prejudice results in wrongful disbelief of marginalised speakers' testimony. iii) Forms of silencing, and 'testimonial smothering', where the misfire occurs before any speech. Research ObjectivesThe Kantian account promises a powerful, systematic approach for understanding these other forms of testimonial failure. My principal objective is to develop this framework, and apply it to the following questions:1) How should we understand the connection between lying, and other prominent cases of (wrongful) failed speech? What is the nature of this wrong? In what way(s) is it morally and epistemologically distinctive?2) On this view, what is the purpose, value, and moral character of testimony? How do related concepts, e.g. credibility and trust, feature into this story? How do these concepts relate to our obligations in testimonial exchanges?3) What account of epistemic agency, and our relations with other epistemic agents, does this picture suggest? What about epistemic agency is morally salient? SignificanceQuestions about the implications of Kant's moral philosophy for the epistemology of testimony are of philosophical interest in their own right. This project also has the potential to give a unified account of a number of phenomena, discussion of which is currently piecemeal. The Kantian approach suggests a more coherent explanation of how their moral and epistemological elements come together. Furthermore, this project is of interest within feminist philosophy; especially the tradition that finds feminist applications of Kantian notions (e.g. objectification, dignity).Central to this inquiry is the idea that one locus of marginalisation is the epistemic sphere: we are not all treated as epistemic equals, and this is seen prominently in how testimony is given and received. While I propose a theoretical framework, it has clear relevance to politically salient, 'real-world' phenomena, e.g. silencing, open secrets (where we all know something we cannot discuss), and whisper networks (where knowledge is transmitted, but must remain unofficial). It is important, from the perspective of social justice, to understand and properly diagnose these cases. MethodologyThis research draws on two substantial bodies on philosophical literature: firstly, work developing Kant's moral philosophy, and his account of lying; and, secondly, recent work in epistemology that emphasises the interpersonal nature of testimony from, e.g., Shiffrin, Miranda Fricker (2007), and Richard Moran (2018). My approach is to explore Kant's account as a route to understanding these special, interpersonal features of testimony. While relying extensively on Kant's moral theory, note that I regard this project as a work in contemporary feminist ethics and epistemology. This is in keeping with a tradition of Kant scholarship that is engaged primarily in the reconstruction of the most plausible and compelling philosophical theories from Kant's materials (i.e., in contrast to an interpretative project, inquiring into Kant as a historical philosopher).