What Else Might We Learn from the Murderer? Towards a Kantian Ethics of Testimony

我们还能从凶手身上学到什么？

• 批准号: 2870524
• 金额: --
• 依托单位: University of Oxford
• 依托单位国家: 英国
• 项目类别: Studentship
• 财政年份: 2023
• 资助国家: 英国
• 起止时间: 2023 至 无数据
• 项目状态: 未结题
• 来源: https://gtr.ukri.org/projects?ref=studentship-2870524
• 关键词: What; Else; Might; Learn; Murderer

ContextKant thinks it is always wrong to lie. This is often considered something of an overreaction. Would-be murderers notwithstanding, however, Kant's account of lying presents a story about the moral character of testimony that is worth taking seriously. My intended research concerns how this picture can be extended and used to theorise about further normative questions in the epistemology of testimony.Existing work on this topic from, e.g., Alix Cohen (2014) and Seana Shiffrin (2014), focusses on the distinctiveness of lying on the Kantian picture. By contrast, my project identifies an important and as yet under-theorised connection between lying, and other cases where the cooperation required for successful speech is wrongfully undermined. For instance: i) Deception without lying, and 'bald-faced' lying, which does not deceive. ii) Testimonial injustice, where prejudice results in wrongful disbelief of marginalised speakers' testimony. iii) Forms of silencing, and 'testimonial smothering', where the misfire occurs before any speech. Research ObjectivesThe Kantian account promises a powerful, systematic approach for understanding these other forms of testimonial failure. My principal objective is to develop this framework, and apply it to the following questions:1) How should we understand the connection between lying, and other prominent cases of (wrongful) failed speech? What is the nature of this wrong? In what way(s) is it morally and epistemologically distinctive?2) On this view, what is the purpose, value, and moral character of testimony? How do related concepts, e.g. credibility and trust, feature into this story? How do these concepts relate to our obligations in testimonial exchanges?3) What account of epistemic agency, and our relations with other epistemic agents, does this picture suggest? What about epistemic agency is morally salient? SignificanceQuestions about the implications of Kant's moral philosophy for the epistemology of testimony are of philosophical interest in their own right. This project also has the potential to give a unified account of a number of phenomena, discussion of which is currently piecemeal. The Kantian approach suggests a more coherent explanation of how their moral and epistemological elements come together. Furthermore, this project is of interest within feminist philosophy; especially the tradition that finds feminist applications of Kantian notions (e.g. objectification, dignity).Central to this inquiry is the idea that one locus of marginalisation is the epistemic sphere: we are not all treated as epistemic equals, and this is seen prominently in how testimony is given and received. While I propose a theoretical framework, it has clear relevance to politically salient, 'real-world' phenomena, e.g. silencing, open secrets (where we all know something we cannot discuss), and whisper networks (where knowledge is transmitted, but must remain unofficial). It is important, from the perspective of social justice, to understand and properly diagnose these cases. MethodologyThis research draws on two substantial bodies on philosophical literature: firstly, work developing Kant's moral philosophy, and his account of lying; and, secondly, recent work in epistemology that emphasises the interpersonal nature of testimony from, e.g., Shiffrin, Miranda Fricker (2007), and Richard Moran (2018). My approach is to explore Kant's account as a route to understanding these special, interpersonal features of testimony. While relying extensively on Kant's moral theory, note that I regard this project as a work in contemporary feminist ethics and epistemology. This is in keeping with a tradition of Kant scholarship that is engaged primarily in the reconstruction of the most plausible and compelling philosophical theories from Kant's materials (i.e., in contrast to an interpretative project, inquiring into Kant as a historical philosopher).

康德认为说谎永远是错误的。这通常被认为是一种过度反应。然而，尽管有可能是杀人犯，康德对撒谎的描述还是提出了一个关于证词道德品质的故事，值得认真对待。我打算研究的问题是如何将这幅图扩展并用于对证词认识论中的进一步规范性问题进行理论化。阿利克斯科恩（2014）和西娜希夫林（2014），重点放在康德的图片说谎的独特性。相比之下，我的项目确定了一个重要的，但尚未在理论上的联系说谎，和其他情况下，成功的演讲所需的合作是错误的破坏。例如：i）不说谎的欺骗，以及不欺骗的“秃头”说谎。二）证词不公正，偏见导致错误地不相信边缘化发言者的证词。三）沉默的形式，和“证词窒息”，其中哑火发生在任何讲话之前。研究目的康德的帐户承诺一个强大的，系统的方法来理解这些其他形式的证词失败。我的主要目标是发展这个框架，并将其应用于以下问题：1）我们应该如何理解说谎和其他突出的（错误的）失败演讲案例之间的联系？这种错误的性质是什么？它在道德和认识论上有什么不同？2)按照这种观点，证词的目的、价值和道德品质是什么？相关的概念，例如可信度和信任，是如何融入这个故事的？这些概念与我们在交换证词时的义务有什么关系？3)这幅图对认识能动性以及我们与其他认识能动性的关系有何启示？认知能动性在道德上是突出的吗？关于康德的道德哲学对证词的认识论的影响的问题本身就具有哲学意义。这个项目也有可能对一些现象作出统一的说明，目前对这些现象的讨论是零敲碎打的。康德的方法建议对它们的道德和认识论元素如何结合在一起进行更连贯的解释。此外，这个项目是在女权主义哲学的兴趣，特别是传统，发现康德的概念（如客体化，尊严）的女权主义应用。这个调查的核心是边缘化的一个轨迹是认识领域的想法：我们不是都被视为认识平等，这是突出地看到，在如何提供和接受证词。虽然我提出了一个理论框架，但它与政治上突出的“现实世界”现象有着明显的相关性，例如沉默，公开的秘密（我们都知道一些我们不能讨论的事情）和耳语网络（知识被传播，但必须保持非官方）。从社会正义的角度来看，理解和正确诊断这些案件很重要。方法本研究借鉴了哲学文献的两个实质性机构：首先，工作发展康德的道德哲学，和他的帐户说谎;其次，最近的工作在认识论，强调人际性质的证词，例如，Shiffrin，米兰达弗里克（2007）和理查德莫兰（2018）。我的方法是探索康德的帐户作为一种途径来理解这些特殊的，人际功能的证词。虽然广泛依赖于康德的道德理论，请注意，我把这个项目作为一个工作，在当代女性主义伦理学和认识论。这与康德学术的传统是一致的，康德学术主要从事从康德的材料中重建最合理和最引人注目的哲学理论（即，与一个解释性的项目相反，探讨康德作为一个历史哲学家）。