Election of Remedies

选择补救措施

• 批准号: 2870577
• 金额: --
• 依托单位: University of Oxford
• 依托单位国家: 英国
• 项目类别: Studentship
• 财政年份: 2023
• 资助国家: 英国
• 起止时间: 2023 至 无数据
• 项目状态: 未结题
• 来源: https://gtr.ukri.org/projects?ref=studentship-2870577
• 关键词: Election; Remedies

Sometimes, claimants have available to them more than one possible remedy. This is true both where they can plead and prove multiple causes of action, as well as when they have pleaded and proved only one. In some cases, claimants can obtain both remedies. For example, a claimant is able both to rescind a contract for misrepresentation and obtain damages for consequential losses on the basis that the misrepresentation was fraudulent (Newbigging v Adam, per Bowen). In other cases, claimants can obtain only one. For example, a claimant cannot claim damages for a breach of a warranted pre-contractual representation as well as rescind the contract for the falsity of that representation (Newbigging).The cases have not systematically explained the principles behind when and why a claimant must elect between remedies - instead (often) relying on the equivocal phrase "double recovery". This gap has not been filled by the secondary literature: surprisingly, for instance, there is no chapter in McGregor on Damages on election. Indeed, the leading theoretical explanation comes in a single article by Watterson: the central claim being that claimants must choose remedies because one remedy, directed at one aim, may indirectly achieve the aims of another - it is unnecessary to award both to that extent. Yet, without more development, this "excessive remedial cumulation" thesis does not neatly explain the cases. Consider two examples. Returning, on the one hand, to the cases already mentioned, why are damages and rescission sometimes an "excessive remedial cumulation" and sometimes not? One might think that since the right to rescind and the right to damages arise from the same wrong these remedies should indirectly achieve the aims of the other (Goldrei v Sinclair, per Bankes). Why, on the other hand, are profit-stripping awards and compensatory damages always an "excessive remedial cumulation" (Tang Man Sit)? It is difficult to see how profit-stripping awards (which do not arise for a wrong) indirectly achieve the aims of compensation for a wrong (Birks).This DPhil project seeks to rationalise the election of remedies systematically for the first time. The methodology is "interpretative" in that the project seeks to produce a theory that best explains the law (in terms of fit, coherence, desirability, etc). The project will broadly be structured in two parts. First, it will systematically be investigated when (as a matter of doctrine) the claimant must elect between multiple remedies: can a claimant combine compensation and gain-based awards? Rescission and gain-based awards? Exemplary damages and compensation? Etc. Second, various theoretical explanations as to why the claimant must elect will then be discussed. One possibility, for example, is that election of remedies is grounded on policy: no election is required in fraudulent misrepresentation to discourage fraud. But, given that the courts do not reason in this way, a better (provisional) theory might be that the secondary remedial rights arising from each remedy depend on the underlying primary rights and duties. It may, therefore, be the case that there is no general principle explaining when multiple remedies are available. This DPhil project is not important just because the election of remedies is descriptively and normatively uncertain - after all, much of the law is. This area "deserves...attention" because it is vital in practice that claimants know which remedies are available and why (Burrows). "As the law stands, potential litigants, their lawyers, and courts have no satisfactory basis on which to decide the proper relationship between the remedies" (Watterson). That was the position when Watterson wrote his article in 2003 and (unacceptably) it remains the position in 2023. This DPhil project will comprehensively change that.

有时，索赔人可利用不止一种可能的补救办法。这是真实的，无论是在他们可以抗辩和证明多个诉讼原因，以及当他们抗辩和证明只有一个。在某些情况下，索赔人可以获得两种补救办法。例如，索赔人既可以因虚假陈述而撤销合同，也可以因虚假陈述具有欺诈性而获得相应损失的损害赔偿（纽比格诉Adam，per Bowen）。在其他情况下，索赔人只能获得一个。例如，索赔人既不能因违反了有保证的合同前陈述而要求损害赔偿，也不能因该陈述的虚假性而撤销合同（纽比格），这些案例没有系统地解释索赔人何时以及为何必须在救济之间作出选择的原则，而是（经常）依赖于模棱两可的“双重赔偿”一词。这一空白并没有被次要文献所填补：令人惊讶的是，例如，《麦格雷戈论选举损害赔偿》中没有一章。实际上，主要的理论解释来自Watterson的一篇文章：其核心主张是，索赔人必须选择补救办法，因为一种补救办法，针对一个目标，可能间接实现另一个目标-没有必要在这种程度上对两种补救办法都作出裁决。然而，如果没有更多的发展，这种“过度补救性积累”的论点并不能很好地解释这些案例。考虑两个例子。一方面，回到已经提到的案例，为什么损害赔偿和解除有时是“过度补救性累积”，有时不是？人们可能会认为，既然撤销权和损害赔偿权产生于同一不法行为，这些补救办法应间接实现对方的目的（Goldrei v Sinclair，per Bankes）。另一方面，为什么利润剥离奖和补偿性损害赔偿总是一种“过度补救累积”（邓文薛）？很难看出利润剥离裁决（并非因不法行为而产生）如何间接实现了对不法行为的赔偿目的（伯克斯）。哲学博士的这一项目试图首次系统地合理化补救措施的选择。该方法是“解释性的”，因为该项目力求提出一种最能解释法律的理论（在适合性、连贯性、可取性等方面）。该项目将大致分为两个部分。首先，将系统地调查索赔人何时（作为一个理论问题）必须在多种补救办法之间作出选择：索赔人能否将联合收割机赔偿和基于收益的裁决结合起来？撤销和基于收益的奖励？惩罚性损害赔偿和赔偿？其次，各种理论解释，为什么索赔人必须选择，然后将讨论。例如，一种可能性是，救济的选择是基于政策的：在欺诈性虚假陈述中不需要选择，以阻止欺诈。但是，鉴于法院不以这种方式进行推理，一个更好的（临时）理论可能是，每种补救办法产生的次要补救权利取决于基本的主要权利和义务。因此，情况可能是，没有一般性原则来解释何时存在多种补救办法。这个哲学博士项目并不重要，因为补救措施的选择是不确定的，也是不规范的--毕竟，大部分法律是不确定的。这片区域值得...注意”，因为在实践中至关重要的是，索赔人知道有哪些补救办法以及为什么有这些办法（Burrows）。“根据法律规定，潜在的诉讼当事人、他们的律师和法院没有令人满意的基础来决定补救措施之间的适当关系”（沃特森）。这是沃特森在2003年写文章时的立场，（令人无法接受的）它仍然是2023年的立场。这个DPhil项目将全面改变这一点。