Election of Remedies

有时，索赔人有不止一种可能的补救办法。无论是在他们可以抗辩并证明多个诉因的情况下，还是在他们只抗辩并证明一个诉因的情况下，这都是正确的。在某些情况下，索赔人可以同时获得这两种补救办法。例如，索赔人既可以撤销虚假陈述合同，又可以根据虚假陈述是欺诈性的，获得相应损失的损害赔偿(Newbigging诉Adam，Per Bowen)。在其他情况下，索赔人只能获得一份。例如，索赔人不能就违反授权的合同前陈述要求损害赔偿，也不能撤销虚假陈述的合同(Newbigging)。案例没有系统地解释索赔人何时以及为什么必须在补救措施之间做出选择的背后的原则--相反，(通常)依赖于模棱两可的短语“双重赔偿”。这一空白没有被二次文献填补：令人惊讶的是，例如，《麦格雷戈》中没有关于选举损害赔偿的章节。事实上，主要的理论解释来自Watterson的一篇文章：核心主张是，索赔人必须选择补救措施，因为一种补救措施针对一个目的，可能间接实现另一种目的--没有必要在那种程度上同时做出两项裁决。然而，如果没有更多的发展，这种“过度补救累积”的论点并不能很好地解释这些案例。考虑两个例子。一方面，回到前面提到的情况，为什么损害赔偿和解除有时是“过度的补救累积”，有时不是？有人可能认为，由于撤销权和损害赔偿权产生于同一错误，这些补救办法应间接实现另一方的目的(Goldrei诉辛克莱，Per Bankes)。另一方面，为什么剥离利润的赔偿和补偿性损害赔偿总是一种“过度的补救累积”(唐文薛)？很难看出利润剥夺奖(不是因为错误而产生的)如何间接实现错误补偿(Birks)的目的。DPhil项目首次寻求系统地使补救措施的选择合理化。该方法是“解释性的”，因为该项目寻求产生一种最能解释法律的理论(在适合性、连贯性、可取性等方面)。该项目将大致分为两个部分。首先，当索赔人(原则上)必须在多种补救办法之间做出选择时，将对其进行系统调查：索赔人是否可以将赔偿和基于收益的赔偿结合起来？撤销和基于收益的奖励？惩罚性损害赔偿？等。其次，将讨论关于索赔人为什么必须选择的各种理论解释。例如，一种可能性是，选择补救措施是基于政策：欺诈性失实陈述不需要选举来阻止欺诈。但是，鉴于法院不以这种方式进行推理，一种更好的(临时)理论可能是，每一种补救办法产生的次要补救权利取决于基本的主要权利和义务。因此，情况可能是没有一般原则来解释何时有多种补救办法可用。DPhil的这个项目并不重要，只是因为补救措施的选择在描述性和规范性上是不确定的--毕竟，法律的大部分都是不确定的。这一领域“值得……关注”，因为在实践中至关重要的是，索赔人必须知道哪些补救办法可用以及为什么可用(巴罗斯)。“就目前的法律而言，潜在的诉讼当事人、他们的律师和法院没有令人满意的基础来决定补救措施之间的适当关系”(沃特森)。这是沃特森在2003年撰写文章时的立场，(令人无法接受的是)2023年仍是这样。这个DPhil项目将全面改变这一点。

Sometimes, claimants have available to them more than one possible remedy. This is true both where they can plead and prove multiple causes of action, as well as when they have pleaded and proved only one. In some cases, claimants can obtain both remedies. For example, a claimant is able both to rescind a contract for misrepresentation and obtain damages for consequential losses on the basis that the misrepresentation was fraudulent (Newbigging v Adam, per Bowen). In other cases, claimants can obtain only one. For example, a claimant cannot claim damages for a breach of a warranted pre-contractual representation as well as rescind the contract for the falsity of that representation (Newbigging).The cases have not systematically explained the principles behind when and why a claimant must elect between remedies - instead (often) relying on the equivocal phrase "double recovery". This gap has not been filled by the secondary literature: surprisingly, for instance, there is no chapter in McGregor on Damages on election. Indeed, the leading theoretical explanation comes in a single article by Watterson: the central claim being that claimants must choose remedies because one remedy, directed at one aim, may indirectly achieve the aims of another - it is unnecessary to award both to that extent. Yet, without more development, this "excessive remedial cumulation" thesis does not neatly explain the cases. Consider two examples. Returning, on the one hand, to the cases already mentioned, why are damages and rescission sometimes an "excessive remedial cumulation" and sometimes not? One might think that since the right to rescind and the right to damages arise from the same wrong these remedies should indirectly achieve the aims of the other (Goldrei v Sinclair, per Bankes). Why, on the other hand, are profit-stripping awards and compensatory damages always an "excessive remedial cumulation" (Tang Man Sit)? It is difficult to see how profit-stripping awards (which do not arise for a wrong) indirectly achieve the aims of compensation for a wrong (Birks).This DPhil project seeks to rationalise the election of remedies systematically for the first time. The methodology is "interpretative" in that the project seeks to produce a theory that best explains the law (in terms of fit, coherence, desirability, etc). The project will broadly be structured in two parts. First, it will systematically be investigated when (as a matter of doctrine) the claimant must elect between multiple remedies: can a claimant combine compensation and gain-based awards? Rescission and gain-based awards? Exemplary damages and compensation? Etc. Second, various theoretical explanations as to why the claimant must elect will then be discussed. One possibility, for example, is that election of remedies is grounded on policy: no election is required in fraudulent misrepresentation to discourage fraud. But, given that the courts do not reason in this way, a better (provisional) theory might be that the secondary remedial rights arising from each remedy depend on the underlying primary rights and duties. It may, therefore, be the case that there is no general principle explaining when multiple remedies are available. This DPhil project is not important just because the election of remedies is descriptively and normatively uncertain - after all, much of the law is. This area "deserves...attention" because it is vital in practice that claimants know which remedies are available and why (Burrows). "As the law stands, potential litigants, their lawyers, and courts have no satisfactory basis on which to decide the proper relationship between the remedies" (Watterson). That was the position when Watterson wrote his article in 2003 and (unacceptably) it remains the position in 2023. This DPhil project will comprehensively change that.