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Experience of Mental Control

精神控制经验

基本信息

批准号：
7171511
负责人：
DANIEL M WEGNER
金额：
$ 19.32万
依托单位：
HARVARD UNIVERSITY
依托单位国家：
美国
项目类别：
财政年份：
1992
资助国家：
美国
起止时间：
1992-06-01 至 2009-01-31
项目状态：
已结题

项目摘要

DESCRIPTION (provided by applicant): Effective personal adaptation and social life depend on our ability to discern our own actions and thoughts from those of others. This is not always a simple discrimination, and it is fortunate that our own actions and thoughts are usually marked with a unique feeling, an experience of conscious will. This feeling separates our actions and thoughts from those that seem to have been done or thought by others or caused by events in the world. This research tests a theory of apparent mental causation, which suggests that this experience of conscious will arises when we infer that our thoughts have caused our actions. According to this theory, we are likely to experience conscious will for what we do when we have thoughts that are consistent with what we do, when these thoughts occur just before what we do, and when other potential causes of what we do are not obvious to us. These principles of consistency, priority, and exclusivity suggest why and when people might experience conscious will erroneously--feeling that they controlled an action, for example, when they did not, or feeling that they did not perform an action when in fact they did. Seventeen studies examine conditions that create these illusions by testing the role of these principles in the experience of conscious will. They focus on this experience in everyday actions, as well as in laboratory settings that allow the precise determination of the influence of the principles. Some of the studies test the principles in the case of the vicarious experience of will for the actions of others, and others examine how these principles can yield an understanding of unwilled actions. A final set of studies explores the relationship between processes of action production and processes underlying the experience of will. One such study investigates a clinical application of the theory by assessing how patients with obsessive-compulsive disorder can be influenced to understand their own mental control processes, and so to reduce the intrusive thoughts and unwilled actions that are symptoms of this disorder.

有效的个人适应和社会生活取决于我们辨别自己的行为和思想与他人的能力。这并不总是一个简单的区别，幸运的是，我们自己的行为和思想通常带有一种独特的感觉，一种有意识的意志体验。这种感觉将我们的行为和思想与那些似乎是由他人所做或所想或由世界上的事件引起的行为和思想区分开来。这项研究测试了一个明显的心理因果关系理论，该理论表明，当我们推断我们的思想导致了我们的行为时，这种有意识的意志体验就会出现。根据这一理论，当我们的想法与我们所做的事情相一致时，当这些想法恰好发生在我们所做的事情之前时，当我们所做的事情的其他潜在原因对我们来说并不明显时，我们很可能会体验到我们所做的事情的意识意志。这些一致性、优先性和排他性的原则表明，人们为什么以及何时会错误地体验到有意识的意志--例如，当他们没有控制某个行为时，他们会感觉自己控制了某个行为;或者当他们实际上执行了某个行为时，他们会感觉自己没有执行某个行为。17项研究通过测试这些原则在有意识意志体验中的作用，考察了产生这些错觉的条件。他们专注于日常行动中的这种体验，以及在实验室环境中，允许精确确定原则的影响。一些研究测试的情况下，将他人的行为的意志的替代经验的原则，和其他检查这些原则如何可以产生一个非意愿的行动的理解。最后一组研究探讨了行动产生过程与意志体验过程之间的关系。其中一项研究调查了这一理论的临床应用，评估了如何影响强迫症患者理解自己的心理控制过程，从而减少这种疾病症状的侵入性想法和无意行为。