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Self-Knowledge & Action

自知之明

基本信息

批准号：
AH/F006489/1
负责人：
Adrian Haddock
金额：
$ 2.82万
依托单位：
University of Stirling
依托单位国家：
英国
项目类别：
Research Grant
财政年份：
2008
资助国家：
英国
起止时间：
2008 至无数据
项目状态：
已结题

来源：
https://gtr.ukri.org/projects?ref=AH%2FF006489%2F1
关键词：
Self Knowledge Action

项目摘要

This project is part of an ongoing enquiry into the nature of intentional bodily action. Its topic is the propositional knowledge that agents have of their own intentional bodily actions / 'action knowledge', for short. And its concern is the value and nature of action knowledge. I will claim that action knowledge is valuable to us because agents are simply incapable of acting intentionally unless they possess such knowledge, and acting intentionally is something we value. But how exactly is such knowledge of value to us? Is it of instrumental value (valuable because it is a means by which we may achieve a valued goal), or of intrinsic value (valuable not because of anything else we value, but for its own sake)? To say that action knowledge is of instrumental value to us implies that there is a merely contingent connection between such knowledge and what we value, which is not the case here. And to say that it is of intrinsic value to us implies that we do not value it because of the connection it bears to other things we value, which also seems false. In the first part of this project, I will offer a resolution of this difficulty. I will argue that acting intentionally is intrinsically valuable. I will then claim that possessing action knowledge just is acting in a certain way, namely with knowledge of what one is intentionally doing, and that acting with such knowledge just is acting intentionally. This will allow me to claim that, because acting intentionally is intrinsically valuable, so is action knowledge. The second part of the project focuses on a problem for understanding the nature of action knowledge. Intentional bodily actions are widely believed to involve at least two metaphysically distinct items: intentions, and bodily movements. So, it looks as if, in order to have action knowledge, agents need to know both that they have an appropriate intention, and that their body moves in an appropriate way. But now it seems that there is a difficulty. An agent surely needs the help of her senses in order to know how her body moves. In which case, it looks as if action knowledge cannot simply be self-knowledge, because traditional accounts maintain that self-knowledge is non-observational in the sense that it does not involve beliefs that are grounded in the operations of the senses. By the same token, an agent's knowledge of her own intentions must surely be non-observational. So, it also looks as if action knowledge cannot simply be observational, in the sense that it cannot simply involve beliefs that are grounded in the operations of the senses. Might it be a hybrid, involving as distinct elements observational knowledge of movement, and non-observational knowledge of intention? I will argue that it cannot be a hybrid in this way, and provide a different account of how it ought to be understood. The account I will offer takes off from my resolution to the value problem. If possessing action knowledge is acting intentionally, the conditions for one to do the former will be the conditions for one to do the latter. In this light, I will develop an account that allows action knowledge to be a kind of self-knowledge, by claiming that items of observational knowledge are required as conditions for being able to do such-and-such intentionally, and as conditions for being able to know that one is doing such-and-such intentionally, but not as grounds for believing that one is intentionally doing such-and-such. The research summarised here will result in three chapters for a co-authored monograph, where each author has responsibility for three chapters of the monograph. This monograph will be submitted for publication to a world-class academic publisher.

该项目是正在进行的对故意身体行为性质的调查的一部分。它的主题是主体对自己的有意身体行为的命题知识/简称为“行为知识”。它关注的是行动知识的价值和性质。我主张，行动知识对我们来说是有价值的，因为行动者除非拥有这种知识，否则根本无法有意识地行动，而有意识地行动是我们所重视的。但这些知识对我们有什么价值呢？它是工具价值（有价值是因为它是我们实现有价值目标的手段），还是内在价值（有价值不是因为我们重视的其他东西，而是因为它本身）？说行动知识对我们具有工具价值，意味着这种知识和我们所重视的东西之间仅仅存在偶然的联系，而这里的情况并非如此。说它对我们具有内在价值，意味着我们不重视它，因为它与我们重视的其他东西有联系，这似乎也是错误的。在这个项目的第一部分，我将提供一个解决这个困难。我认为，有意识地行动具有内在价值。然后，我将主张，拥有行动知识只是以某种方式行动，也就是说，知道一个人在有意地做什么，而带着这样的知识行动就是有意地行动。这将使我能够主张，因为有意行动具有内在价值，所以行动知识也是如此。该项目的第二部分集中在理解行动知识的性质的问题。有意识的身体动作被广泛认为至少涉及两个不同的隐喻项目：意图和身体动作。因此，看起来，为了拥有行动知识，智能体需要知道他们有一个适当的意图，以及他们的身体以适当的方式移动。但现在看来，有一个困难。一个代理人肯定需要她的感官的帮助，以了解她的身体如何移动。在这种情况下，行动知识似乎不可能仅仅是自我认识，因为传统的解释认为，自我认识是非观察性的，因为它不涉及基于感官运作的信念。出于同样的原因，一个行动者对自己意图的了解肯定是非观察性的。因此，行动知识似乎也不能简单地是观察性的，因为它不能简单地涉及基于感官操作的信念。它可能是一个混合体，包括作为不同元素的运动的观察知识，和意图的非观察知识？我将论证它不可能是这样的混合体，并提供一个关于应该如何理解它的不同解释。我将提供的说明从我对价值问题的解决方案开始。如果拥有行动知识就是有意地行动，那么做前者的条件就是做后者的条件。在这种背景下，我将展开一种解释，允许行动知识成为一种自我知识，通过声称观察知识的项目是作为能够有意地做某某事情的条件所必需的，并且作为能够知道一个人正在有意地做某某事情的条件，但不是作为相信一个人正在有意地做某某事情的理由。这里总结的研究将导致三个章节的合著专著，其中每个作者有三个章节的专著的责任。这本专著将提交给世界一流的学术出版社出版。