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Three Essays on Idealism

关于理想主义的三篇论文

基本信息

批准号：
AH/J002348/1
负责人：
Adrian Haddock
金额：
$ 3.67万
依托单位：
University of Stirling
依托单位国家：
英国
项目类别：
Fellowship
财政年份：
2012
资助国家：
英国
起止时间：
2012 至无数据
项目状态：
已结题

来源：
https://gtr.ukri.org/projects?ref=AH%2FJ002348%2F1
关键词：
Three Essays Idealism

项目摘要

This project is part of an ongoing enquiry into the relationship between objectivity and idealism. It can seem that the position which philosophers call idealism contradicts a certain intuitive conception of objectivity. According to that conception, the things we human beings say and think are at least capable of being true, and-in the best case-of constituting knowledge; but whether or not they are true, and so whether or not they are, because of their truth, candidates for constituting knowledge, depends on nothing else but how the world is-where the world is something which is (in some sense to be explained) independent of us. According to idealism, however, the world, upon which our thoughts depend for their truth and falsity-or, as we might put it, to which our thoughts are *answerable*-is (in some sense to be explained) not independent of us. And yet, there is a strain of thought, running through modern philosophy from at least Kant onwards, which sees idealism not as an opponent of but as a necessary condition for objectivity. This strain of thought is sometimes associated with the idea that idealism is not opposed to *realism*, but rather coincident with realism. That idea is redolent not only of a famous remark of Wittgenstein's, but also of one of Kant's aspirations for his transcendental idealism, namely, that it counts as a form of realism-what he calls 'empirical realism'. Various philosophers have been attracted to a position describable both as a form of idealism and as a form of realism. In three recently published essays, I have sought to explore such a position by considering how it figures in the work of two prominent contemporary Anglo-American philosophers: Donald Davidson, and John McDowell. The line I take, in each of these essays, is that idealism and realism will not coincide in the way these philosophers want them to. And the explanation I offer for why this is so is that McDowell and Davidson both work with a certain naturalistic conception of who 'we' are-a conception which much contemporary Anglo-American philosophy simply takes for granted. During my planned period of leave, I shall take this project further, in three ways. First, I shall consider how the aforementioned position figures in the work of one more contemporary Anglo-American philosopher, namely Hilary Putnam. Putnam advances a position which he calls 'internal realism', which he intends to count both as a form of idealism, and as a form of realism. I shall argue that this intention is not fulfilled. I shall suggest that Putnam is right to think of his position as a form of idealism, but wrong to think of it as a form of realism. And this is because it is rightly thought of as a form of transcendental idealism, a position which-in my view-is not rightly thought of as a form of realism at all. Secondly, I shall broaden the focus which the project has taken so far, by exploring the origins of the aforementioned position in the work of Kant. Centrally, I shall argue for a reading of transcendental idealism according to which it is not a form of realism-not because it sees the world, to which our thoughts are answerable, as somehow 'constructed' by the activity of our minds, but because it demarcates the world, to which our thoughts answer, from the truly real reality, to which our thoughts are incapable of answering. Thirdly, I shall develop an argument for the claim that, in fact, transcendental idealism is required in order to sustain the intuitive conception of objectivity. This will build on a famous argument of John McDowell's, to the effect that a form of idealism is needed to sustain this conception. Contrary to what McDowell claims, however, I shall suggest that the form of idealism in question is transcendental idealism, rather than the different form McDowell aims to defend.

这个项目是对客观性和理想主义之间关系的持续调查的一部分。哲学家们称之为唯心主义的立场似乎与客观性的某种直观概念相矛盾。根据这一概念，我们人类所说的和所想的东西至少能够是真的，并且在最好的情况下能够构成知识;但是它们是否是真的，因此它们是否因为它们的真理而成为构成知识的候选者，取决于世界是怎样的，而世界是某种（在某种意义上有待解释的）独立于我们的东西。根据唯心主义，然而，世界，我们的思想依赖于他们的真理和谬误，或者，我们可以把它，我们的思想是“负责”，是（在某种意义上解释）不是独立于我们。然而，有一种思想，至少从康德开始贯穿现代哲学，它认为唯心主义不是客观性的对手，而是客观性的必要条件。这种思想倾向有时与理想主义并不反对现实主义，而是与现实主义相一致的想法有关。这个想法不仅让人联想到维特根斯坦的一句名言，而且也让人联想到康德对他的先验唯心主义的一个渴望，即它被视为一种形式的实在论，他称之为“经验实在论”。许多哲学家都被一种既可以被描述为唯心主义形式又可以被描述为现实主义形式的立场所吸引。在最近发表的三篇文章中，我试图探讨这样一种立场，通过考虑它在当代两位杰出的英美哲学家唐纳德·戴维森和约翰·麦克道尔的著作中是如何出现的。我在每一篇文章中所采取的路线是，唯心主义和现实主义不会以这些哲学家所希望的方式重合。对于为什么会这样，我给出的解释是，麦克道尔和戴维森都是以一种关于“我们”是谁的自然主义概念来工作的，而这种概念在当代英美哲学中被认为是理所当然的。在我计划休假期间，我将从三个方面进一步推进这个项目。首先，我将考虑上述立场如何在另一位当代英美哲学家，即希拉里·普特南的著作中出现。普特南提出了一个他称之为“内在实在论”的立场，他打算把它既当作一种唯心主义形式，又当作一种实在论形式。我认为这个意图没有实现。我认为普特南把自己的立场看作是一种唯心主义是正确的，但把它看作是一种现实主义是错误的。这是因为它被正确地认为是先验唯心主义的一种形式，在我看来，这种立场根本不被正确地认为是现实主义的一种形式。第二，我将通过探索康德著作中上述立场的起源，来拓宽本课题迄今为止所关注的焦点。最重要的是，我将主张对先验唯心主义进行阅读，根据这种阅读，先验唯心主义不是实在论的一种形式--不是因为它把我们的思想所能回答的世界看作是由我们的思想活动以某种方式“构造”出来的，而是因为它把我们的思想所能回答的世界与我们的思想所不能回答的真正的真实的实在区分开来。第三，我将为这样一种主张展开一个论证，即事实上，为了维持客观性的直观概念，需要先验唯心主义。这将建立在约翰·麦克道尔的一个著名论点的基础上，大意是需要一种理想主义形式来维持这一概念。然而，与麦克道尔所主张的相反，我将提出，所讨论的唯心主义的形式是先验唯心主义，而不是麦克道尔旨在捍卫的不同形式。