Posted prices, bargaining and auctions: an experimental examination

公布价格、讨价还价和拍卖：实验检验

• 批准号: DP140100274
• 负责人: Prof Nicholas Feltovich
• 金额: $ 10.63万
• 依托单位: Monash University
• 依托单位国家: 澳大利亚
• 项目类别: Discovery Projects
• 财政年份: 2014
• 资助国家: 澳大利亚
• 起止时间: 2014-01-01 至 2019-12-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://dataportal.arc.gov.au/RGS/Web/Grants/DP140100274
• 关键词: Posted; prices; bargaining; auctions; experimental

This project uses economic methods to investigate how trading institutions affect prices and efficiency. It examines markets with directed search: buyers visit sellers based on any information they have. Simultaneous buyer choices and sellers’ capacity constraints lead to “frictions” where not all profitable exchanges occur - more realistic than the usual “frictionless” assumption. The project will vary: whether sellers can post prices in advance; and, whether and how negotiation occurs based on how many buyers (one vs two or more) visit a seller. The project will use results from auction, bargaining, game and search theories, and new analysis, to form predictions, which will be tested using experiments. The results should have implications for labour and competition policies.

本项目运用经济学方法研究交易制度如何影响价格和效率。它通过定向搜索来考察市场：买家根据他们所拥有的任何信息访问卖家。买方的选择和卖方的能力限制同时导致了“摩擦”，其中并非所有有利可图的交易都发生了--比通常的“无摩擦”假设更现实。该项目将有所不同：卖方是否可以提前发布价格;以及，是否以及如何根据有多少买家（一个对两个或更多）访问卖方进行谈判。该项目将使用拍卖，讨价还价，博弈和搜索理论以及新的分析结果来形成预测，并将使用实验进行测试。研究结果应当对劳工和竞争政策产生影响。