Posted prices, bargaining and auctions: an experimental examination

这个项目使用经济学方法来调查交易机构如何影响价格和效率。它通过定向搜索来检查市场：买家根据他们掌握的任何信息访问卖家。同时，买方的选择和卖方的能力限制导致了“摩擦”，在这种情况下，并非所有有利可图的交易都发生了——这比通常的“无摩擦”假设更现实。项目会有所不同：卖家是否可以提前贴出价格；以及，谈判是否以及如何发生取决于有多少买家（一个vs两个或更多）拜访卖家。该项目将利用拍卖、讨价还价、博弈和搜索理论的结果，以及新的分析，形成预测，并将通过实验进行测试。研究结果应该会对劳工和竞争政策产生影响。

This project uses economic methods to investigate how trading institutions affect prices and efficiency. It examines markets with directed search: buyers visit sellers based on any information they have. Simultaneous buyer choices and sellers’ capacity constraints lead to “frictions” where not all profitable exchanges occur - more realistic than the usual “frictionless” assumption. The project will vary: whether sellers can post prices in advance; and, whether and how negotiation occurs based on how many buyers (one vs two or more) visit a seller. The project will use results from auction, bargaining, game and search theories, and new analysis, to form predictions, which will be tested using experiments. The results should have implications for labour and competition policies.