Computation in Auctions, Markets and Networks.

拍卖、市场和网络中的计算。

• 批准号: RGPIN-2017-06107
• 负责人: Vetta, Adrian
• 金额: $ 2.48万
• 依托单位: McGill University
• 依托单位国家: 加拿大
• 项目类别: Discovery Grants Program - Individual
• 财政年份: 2017
• 资助国家: 加拿大
• 起止时间: 2017-01-01 至 2018-12-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nserc-crsng.gc.ca/ase-oro/Details-Detailles_eng.asp?id=634800
• 关键词: Computation; Auctions; Markets; Networks.

This Discovery Grant proposal concerns algorithmic economics and mechanism design. In practical mechanism design, several aspects are of fundamental importance. In general, mechanisms should be resistant against strategic gaming and should produce economically efficient outcomes. Moreover, they should be simple and must be computational implementable. These attributes can, in turn, lead to other desirable properties such as speed and fairness. The primary aim of this proposal will be to mathematically examine the performance trade-offs between the corresponding multiple objectives, and to design mechanisms with provably high performance. Three major areas of application concern the design of combinatorial auctions for selling spectrum, pollution reduction mechanisms, and the design of market places in industrial organization.

这个发现补助金提案涉及算法经济学和机制设计。在实际的机构设计中，有几个方面是至关重要的。一般来说，机制应该能够抵制战略博弈，并产生经济有效的结果。此外，它们应该是简单的，并且必须是计算可实现的。这些属性可以反过来导致其他期望的属性，例如速度和公平性。该提案的主要目的是从数学上研究相应的多个目标之间的性能权衡，并设计具有可证明的高性能的机制。三个主要的应用领域涉及组合拍卖出售频谱的设计，减少污染的机制，以及在产业组织的市场空间的设计。