Computation in Auctions, Markets and Networks.

拍卖、市场和网络中的计算。

• 批准号: RGPIN-2017-06107
• 负责人: Vetta, Adrian
• 金额: $ 2.48万
• 依托单位: McGill University
• 依托单位国家: 加拿大
• 项目类别: Discovery Grants Program - Individual
• 财政年份: 2020
• 资助国家: 加拿大
• 起止时间: 2020-01-01 至 2021-12-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nserc-crsng.gc.ca/ase-oro/Details-Detailles_eng.asp?id=711804
• 关键词: Computation; Auctions; Markets; Networks.

This Discovery Grant proposal concerns algorithmic economics and mechanism design. In practical mechanism design, several aspects are of fundamental importance. In general, mechanisms should be resistant against strategic gaming and should produce economically efficient outcomes. Moreover, they should be simple and must be computational implementable. These attributes can, in turn, lead to other desirable properties such as speed and fairness. The primary aim of this proposal will be to mathematically examine the performance trade-offs between the corresponding multiple objectives, and to design mechanisms with provably high performance. Three major areas of application concern the design of combinatorial auctions for selling spectrum, pollution reduction mechanisms, and the design of market places in industrial organization. For many of these projects, networks play a fundamental role in modelling the underlying problem structure. Consequently, algorithmic methods from graph theory and combinatorics will be at the heart of our quantitative analyses.

这项发现拨款提案涉及算法经济学和机制设计。在实际的机械设计中，有几个方面是至关重要的。一般而言，机制应抵制战略博弈，并应产生经济上有效的结果。此外，它们应该是简单的，并且必须是可计算实现的。这些属性反过来可以导致其他所需的属性，如速度和公平性。这项提议的主要目的将是从数学上审查相应的多个目标之间的绩效权衡，并设计具有可证明的高绩效的机制。三个主要的应用领域涉及出售频谱的组合拍卖的设计，减少污染的机制，以及产业组织中市场的设计。 对于这些项目中的许多项目，网络在对潜在问题结构进行建模方面扮演着基本角色。因此，来自图论和组合学的算法方法将是我们定量分析的核心。