Computation in Auctions, Markets and Networks.

点击翻译按钮获取中文摘要

This Discovery Grant proposal concerns algorithmic economics and mechanism design. In practical mechanism design, several aspects are of fundamental importance. In general, mechanisms should be resistant against strategic gaming and should produce economically efficient outcomes. Moreover, they should be simple and must be computational implementable. These attributes can, in turn, lead to other desirable properties such as speed and fairness. The primary aim of this proposal will be to mathematically examine the performance trade-offs between the corresponding multiple objectives, and to design mechanisms with provably high performance. Three major areas of application concern the design of combinatorial auctions for selling spectrum, pollution reduction mechanisms, and the design of market places in industrial organization. ***For many of these projects, networks play a fundamental role in modelling the underlying problem structure. Consequently, algorithmic methods from graph theory and combinatorics will be at the heart of our quantitative analyses.