多元目标下金融支农政策的选择性执行研究

本课题针对多元目标下金融支农“上有政策、下有对策”的选择性执行行为，做出基于实地调查与多案例分析的应用基础研究。课题将拓展使用“三层分析”框架和“模糊-冲突”模型，进入政策制定和执行过程，研究政策执行的三大偏离。课题组认为，高层和中层的政策制定在金融控制背景下具有支持“三农”、经济发展、金融安全等多元目标，涉农金融机构在市场化改革以来也具有自身利润、地方发展、中央支农等多元目标。虽然金融支农政策频频出台，但面对中央高层的支农目标，中层在“政治-行政张力”下，会调整政策的模糊性，进行选择性制定；下层在“政治-经济张力”下，会根据政策的“模糊-困难”程度，采取不同策略的选择性执行（顺从执行、拒不执行或变通执行）。课题组提出并验证多元目标和选择性执行两组六个假说，进行多任务委托代理模型、多案例逐项复制和差别复制的实证研究，为金融支农政策由选择性执行，走向忠实性执行，提供适应性调整的管理科学方案。

Based on field survey and multi-case study, this applied basic research analyzes the selective implementation and circumvention of financial policies that support the development of agriculture because of the multi-objectives of policymaker and implementer. This research expandsa three-tier analytical framework and the ambiguity-conflict model to explore the process of policymaking and policy implementation. The policymaker has multi-objectives of financial control and the agro-related financial agencies have multi-objectives such as profit maximization, local development and support of agriculture.In achieving the objective of central government to support agriculture, thefinancial agencies will use different strategy to make and implement related policies(to implement, not to implement or to implement flexibly) according to its ambiguity and difficulty. This research proposes six hypotheses about multi-objectives and selective implementation and tests them with empirical analysis including multi-task principal-agent model as well asliteral replication and theoretical replication of multi-case study.This research aims to provide adaptively adjustable management science solution for the transformation from selective implementation to loyal implementation.