08年金融危机后，学界、商界和政界开始反思一个问题：不当的激励机制是否助长了金融机构的过度风险分担(Excessive risk taking)，从而引发金融危机。而中国银行业的激励机制设计仍是“重绩效，轻风险”，这让人担忧这样的激励机制是否会对中国银行业的长期稳健发展埋下隐患。在这样的背景下，基于银行层面（Bank－level）和贷款层面（Loan－level）数据及其他相关信息，本课题试图回答以下几个问题：1）目前中国银行体系的激励机制到底如何影响银行的贷款行为？是否助长贷款行为的过度风险分担？2）尤其是比较金融危机前后，中国的货币政策经历了从紧缩-宽松-紧缩的过程。在不同的宏观货币经济环境下，激励机制对银行的贷款行为的影响是否发生变化？3）激励机制和货币政策的相互作用是如何影响银行的信贷资源配置效率？厘清上述问题，为政府制定确保银行业稳健发展的相关政策提供借鉴。

The global financial crisis over 2008-9 draws the attention of economists and policy makers to understand the risk taking behavior of financial institutions. There are comments suggesting poor managerial incentives are one of the most fundamental causes of the financial crisis. However, the managerial incentives of China’s banking industry rely heavily on performance, but correlate less with risks. Such incentive mechanism designs probably lead to systematic risks of the banking industry in China in the near future. Employing unique bank-level and loan-level datasets, we try to answer the following questions: 1) How do the incentive mechanism designs impact on bank lending behavior? Do they make banks take excessive risks? 2) China engaged in expansionary monetary policy when the financial crisis hit and switched to contractionary monetary policy in the post-crisis era. Given the changing monetary environment, does the effect of the incentive mechanism designs on lending behavior change? 3) How does the interaction between the monetary policies and the incentive mechanism designs affect credit allocation efficiency? Understanding these questions will help on better banking and monetary policy making.