Knightian Uncertainty

这个项目是关于人类进化理论的大量研究的一部分。 不确定性下的决策 行业和政府 决策者受益于新的和更好的方法， 这条研究路线所产生的决策。 这个项目 在不确定性条件下， 根据弗兰克·奈特对风险和 不确定性 根据奈特的说法，赌博是有风险的，如果 概率是已知的，但不确定概率是否 不知道。 一个关于决策的亚里士多德理论是 在这个项目中发展起来的，用来解释不完全市场， 讨价还价，企业家精神，日常商业决策 经验法则和资产价格 该项目的结果可能导致重大突破， 不确定条件下的决策理论 的 该项目的贡献来自于开发一个 另一种更合理的理论，可能会得到更多的 比贝叶斯理论更有说服力。 比如其中一 贝叶斯决策理论的悖论是，如果两个 每个人都对一个人的行为赋予不同的主观概率， 他们都可以通过交换赌注来获得收益， 事件在一些赔率，但我们很少看到这样的赌注， 现实 该项目根据以下内容进行了严格的解释： 不确定性厌恶和惰性。 这种解释是 一般解释缺乏一些市场的保险 远期合约。 即使研究人员未能完全开发出 满意决策理论 不确定性，该项目将提供新的见解， 重要的问题是：为什么会发生罢工？ 为什么工资 向下刚性？ 为什么合同如此简化， 合同双方放弃互利的收益？ 为什么 证券价格是否如此波动？ 企业为什么要使用 显然效率低下的惯例，如保持广告 支出占销售额的比例不变？

This project is part of a large body of research on the theory of decision making under uncertainty. Industry and government decision makers benefit from the new and better methods of decision making produced by this line of research. This project develops an alternative formulation of choice under uncertainty based on the distinction by Frank Knight between risk and uncertainty. According to Knight a gamble is risky if the probabilities are known and it is uncertain if the probabilities are not known. A Knightian theory of decision making is developed in this project and used to explain incomplete markets, bargaining, entrepreneurship, business decisions made by routine rules of thumb, and asset prices. The results of this project could lead to a major breakthrough in the theory of decision making under uncertainty. The contribution of this project comes from developing an alternative theory that is more plausible and might receive more empirical support than the Bayesian theory. For example, one of the paradoxes of Bayesian decision theory is that if two individuals attach different subjective probabilities to an observable event, then they both can gain by exchanging a bet on the event at some odds, yet we observe little such betting in reality. The project develops a rigorous explanation based on uncertainty aversion and inertia. This explanation is generalized to explain the absence of some markets for insurance and forward contracts. Even if the investigator fails to develop a completely satisfactory alternative theory of decision making under uncertainty, the project will provide new insights into such important questions as: Why do strikes occur? Why are wages downwardly rigid? Why are contracts so simplified that the parties to the contract forego mutually beneficial gains? Why are security prices so volatile? Why do businesses use apparently inefficient routines such as keeping advertising expenditures a constant proportion of sales?