Information and Incentives in Dynamic Games

数理经济学提供了严格的模型和强大的 分析工具，用于研究广泛的重要和 基本经济问题。 该项目强调了一些 数学经济学最活跃的研究领域，即 研究信息和激励措施在以下方面发挥的作用： 经济主体之间的动态谈判。 该项目包括三个部分。 第一部分探讨 博弈中的均衡可能是 球员们从之前的比赛中学习。 这个新 这种方法并没有将学习过程建模为 均衡，而是假设参与者使用不同的 一种“合理”的行为规则。 一个问题 特别要注意的是， 这些行为规则和各种均衡 改进。 第二部分是对单个博弈者研究的概述 声誉效应。 先前的研究发现， 当只有一个玩家拥有一个 保持声誉的动机。 单人玩家可以 通过维持平衡来选择他最喜欢的均衡 名声 第三部分研究了最优的本质 风险中性委托人与风险厌恶者之间的契约 当代理人的行为受到道德风险的影响， 双方当事人可以自由地重新谈判合同后， 代理人已经履行了他的职责，但在所有的影响之前， 探员的行为已经暴露了 的目的 项目的一部分是了解如何约束， 防止重新谈判的合同限制了 代理人可以被迫承担，以及努力的数量， 可以诱导试剂提供。 该项目在方法和实质性方面作出了贡献 我们对信息和激励的理解， 经济博弈的动力学。 在方法上，该项目 开发了一种新的动态游戏方法， 分析师得出，而不仅仅是假设的信念， 游戏的参与者。 传统的方法获得 通过做出“合理”的假设来解决动态博弈 玩家的信仰。 这些假设被称为 均衡优化 不幸的是，博弈论模型 通常无法测试，因为有许多不同的 关于玩家信念的合理假设，每个假设都有一个 不同的结果;因此，这种新方法使我们更接近 可测试的动态博弈论的目标 实质上， 项目提供了新的见解，以激励经济 代理商获得和维护声誉。 契约理论是 扩展到允许研究最佳合同， 其中有一个很长的时间间隔之间的设置， 代理人的行动进行和时间，他们的影响是 实现，在此期间，有可能 重新谈判

Mathematical economics provides rigorous models and powerful analytical tools for studying a wide range of important and fundamental economic issues. This project emphasizes some of most active areas of research in mathematical economics, namely work on the roles played by information and incentives in dynamic bargaining among economic agents. The project consists of three parts. The first part explores the idea that equilibrium in games might arise as the result of the players learning from thir previous play. This new approach does not model the learning process as part of an equilibrium, but rather assumes that the players use different sorts of "reasonable" behavioal rules. One question given special attention is the relationship between restrictions on these behavioral rules and various sorts of euilibrium refinements. The second part generalizes single player studies of reputation-effects. Previous research found the reputation effects particularly powerful when only a single player has an incentive to maintain a reputation. The single player is able to pick out the equilibrium he most prefers through maintaining a reputation. The third part studies the nature of the optimal contract between a risk-neutral principal and a risk-averse agent when the agent's action is subject to moral hazard and the parties are free to renegotiate the contract after the agent has performed his duties but before all the effects of the agent's actions have been revealed. The objective of this part of the project is to learn how the constraint to renegotiation-proof contracts limits the amount of risk that the agent can be forced to bear, and the amount of effort that the agent can be induced to provide. This project makes methodological and substantive contributions to our understanding of information and incentives in the dynamics of economic games. Methodologically, the project develops a new approach to dynamic games that allows the analyst to derive and not just assume the beliefs of the participants in the games. The traditional approach obtains solutions to dynamic games by making "plausible" assumptions about the beliefs of players. These assumptions are called equilibrium refinements. Unfortunately, game-theoretic models usually can not be tested because there are many different plausible assumptions about player beliefs, each with a different outcome; hence, this new approach moves us closer to the goal of a testable dynamic game theory. Substantively, the project provides new insights into the incentives of economic agents to obtain and maintain reputations. Contract theory is extended to permit the study of the optimal contract for settings in which there is a long gap between the time the agent's actions are undertaken and the time their effects are realized and where in the interim there is the possibility of renegotiation.