The Economics of Self Control, and the Evolution of Equilibrium

自我控制的经济学和均衡的演变

• 批准号: 0646816
• 负责人: Drew Fudenberg
• 金额: --
• 依托单位: Harvard University
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Continuing Grant
• 财政年份: 2007
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2007-09-01 至 2010-08-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=0646816&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Economics; Self; Control; Evolution; Equilibrium

Intellectual Merit: Part A) In previous work Levine and Fudenberg developed a "dual-self" model of impulse control, and argue that it provides a tractable and parsimonious way of explaining the facts that are typically used to motivate quasi-hyperbolic preferences, such as time-inconsistency in the choice of monetary rewards and excessive procrastination. This project applies the same model to a new set of applications, including the Allais paradox, which relies on the "Independence axiom" of decision theory being violated in precisely the way that the dual-self model predicts. The project also develops predictions and empirical tests that discriminate between the standard, dual-self, and quasi-hyperbolic preferences.Part B) The starting point for this part of the project is that equilibrium in a game is best understood as the long-run outcome of a non-equilibrium dynamic process of learning, imitation, or evolution. The project focuses on two processes with markedly different domains of applicability and conclusions. The first process studied is one of rational learning by agents who use their observations of past play to form their beliefs about how opponents are likely to play in the future. Previous work has relied on the simplifying assumption that all agents in a given player role receive the same signals and have the same beliefs; the project determines when that simplification is valid.The second process studied is one of boundedly rational imitation or "muddling," where agents tend to copy strategies with higher current payoffs. Most work on evolutionary processes has focused on the case of infinite populations, and in particular on the "replicator dynamic," but the long-run outcome of this model is not always a good approximation to the outcome when population is large but finite. The proposed research helps determine when the limit outcome converges to the prediction of the replicator dynamic as the population size grows. This result is then applied to the study of the evolutionary stability of cooperation when agents can migrate from one society to another. The focus is on when evolutionary forces will lead to "closed" societies that are distrustful of outsiders, and when in contrast societies will be "open."Broader Impacts: (A) Ideas from behavioral economics are now current in law schools and law reviews, leading science journals, and the popular press. However, the first generation of behavioral models has focused on special-purpose assumptions to fit specific facts, and it is now time to develop more systematic behavioral theories that explain many anomalies with the same, preferably few, departures from the standard model. The work in part A of the project contributes to that agenda.(B) The concept of an equilibrium of a game is used in many fields, including political science, sociology, computer science, biology, and psychology. Hence the project's study of how equilibrium can arise from non-equilibrium learning has a substantial impact outside of economics. Developing models of evolution in finite populations is very important for mathematical biology, and has begun to attract the attention of physicists. The particular question of the evolution of cooperation should be of interest to political scientists, sociologists, and biologists as well as to economists.

智力优点：A部分）在之前的工作中，莱文和福登伯格开发了一种冲动控制的“双重自我”模型，并认为它提供了一种易于处理且简约的方式来解释通常用于激发准双曲线偏好的事实，例如货币奖励选择的时间不一致和过度拖延。该项目将相同的模型应用于一组新的应用，包括阿莱悖论，该悖论依赖于决策理论的“独立公理”，而决策理论的“独立公理”正是以双重自我模型预测的方式被违反。该项目还开发了区分标准偏好、双重自我偏好和准双曲线偏好的预测和实证测试。B 部分）该项目这一部分的出发点是，博弈中的均衡最好理解为学习、模仿或进化的非均衡动态过程的长期结果。 该项目重点关注两个具有明显不同的适用范围和结论的过程。 研究的第一个过程是智能体的理性学习过程，智能体利用对过去比赛的观察来形成对对手未来可能如何比赛的信念。 之前的工作依赖于一个简化的假设，即给定玩家角色中的所有代理都会收到相同的信号并具有相同的信念；该项目决定何时该简化是有效的。研究的第二个过程是有限理性模仿或“混乱”之一，其中代理人倾向于复制具有较高当前收益的策略。 大多数关于进化过程的工作都集中在无限种群的情况，特别是“复制动态”，但该模型的长期结果并不总是很好地近似种群数量大但有限时的结果。 拟议的研究有助于确定随着种群规模的增长，极限结果何时收敛到复制动态的预测。 然后，这一结果被应用于研究主体可以从一个社会迁移到另一个社会时合作的进化稳定性。 焦点在于，进化力量何时会导致不信任外来者的“封闭”社会，而相反，社会何时会“开放”。 更广泛的影响：（A）来自行为经济学的思想现在在法学院和法律评论、领先的科学期刊和大众媒体中流行。 然而，第一代行为模型侧重于适合特定事实的特殊目的假设，现在是时候开发更系统的行为理论来解释许多与标准模型有相同（最好是很少）偏离的异常现象。该项目 A 部分的工作对该议程做出了贡献。(B) 博弈均衡的概念应用于许多领域，包括政治学、社会学、计算机科学、生物学和心理学。 因此，该项目对非均衡学习如何产生均衡的研究在经济学之外产生了重大影响。 开发有限种群的进化模型对于数学生物学来说非常重要，并且已经开始引起物理学家的关注。 合作演变的特殊问题应该引起政治学家、社会学家、生物学家以及经济学家的兴趣。