Social Dilemmas With Uncertain Resources

当组成员共享的资源有限时， 所有人都可以自由访问的资源（例如，地下水，能源， 矿物、濒危物种。 当组成员请求他们的 从资源池独立共享，不进行通信 其中，有实验证据表明， 资源规模的不确定性增加，人们 增加他们的要求，从而降低他们的可能性， 请求将被批准。 提出了六个实验来研究 几个变量的影响（例如，不确定性的数量 资源，组大小，实时更新的信息，总 关于解决两种情况下的资源困境 游戏协议 根据一项协议， 同时，在另一个，顺序与完整的 有关以前请求的信息。 建议的实验是 由一个博弈理论模型驱动， 解决方案和决策理论模型。 研究结果应该 有助于理解替代机制的影响 资源困境中的决策行为，这是最 现代社会面临的严重问题。

Resource dilemmas are created when group members shared limited resources to which all have free access(e.g., groundwater, energy, minerals, endangered species.) When group members request their share from the resource pool independently, with no communication among them, there is experimental evidence showing that as the uncertainty about the size of the resource increases, people increase their requests thereby lowering the probability that their request will be granted. Six experiments are proposed to study the effects of several variables (e.g., amount of uncertainty about the resource, group size, real-time updating of information about total group request) about the resolution of resource dilemmas under two protocols of play. Under one protocol, requests are made simultaneously, and under the other, sequentially with full information about previous requests. The proposed experiments are driven by a game theoretical model prescribing an equilibrium solution and by a decision theoretical model. The findings should be useful in understanding the effects of alternative mechanisms on decision behavior in resource dilemmas, which are among the most serious problems facing modern society.