Strategic Buyer Behavior in Markets with Dynamically Priced Goods

商品定价动态的市场中的战略买家行为

• 批准号: 0752662
• 负责人: Amnon Rapoport
• 金额: $ 9.94万
• 依托单位: University of Arizona
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2008
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2008-04-15 至 2012-03-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=0752662&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Strategic; Buyer; Behavior; Markets; Dynamically

Theoretical work on revenue management in a dynamic, multi-period environment has largely been based on the assumption that customers are myopic; namely, that they purchase a good as soon as its price falls below a fixed maximum price that they are willing to pay. Consequently, the focus of research has been on the pricing or inventory decisions made by the seller. The simplifying assumption that buyers are myopic also underlies the experimental research in this area. Research conducted under this award shifts the emphasis to the theoretical and experimental investigation of customers who are assumed to be strategic and rational; ones who are willing to delay their purchase of a perishable good (e.g., an airline ticket or a fashionable dress) in order to exploit potential future price reductions. The research involves developing models prescribing how a rational and strategic buyer should act and then testing the descriptive power of these models in carefully controlled experiments. These experiments involve implementing the assumptions of the model in a computer-controlled laboratory with participants assuming the role of buyers who receive monetary payoffs contingent on their performance. Decisions made in these experiments will be recorded, observed behavior compared to that prescribed by a model of optimal behavior, and any replicable and systematic differences between observed and predicted behavior (e.g., buyers may delay their purchase for too long or, alternatively, may buy too early given their expectations about future price paths) identified. Practical implications for both sellers and buyers engaged in the selling and buying of perishable goods in a multi-period season will also be derived.

在动态的、多时期的环境中，关于收入管理的理论工作在很大程度上是基于这样的假设：消费者是短视的；也就是说，一旦商品的价格低于他们愿意支付的固定最高价格，他们就会购买。因此，研究的重点一直集中在卖方的定价或库存决策上。买家目光短浅的简化假设也是这一领域的实验研究的基础。根据该奖项进行的研究将重点转移到对被认为具有战略和理性的客户的理论和实验调查上；这些客户愿意推迟购买易腐烂的商品(例如，机票或时尚服装)，以利用未来可能的降价机会。这项研究包括开发模型，规定理性和战略买家应该如何行动，然后在精心控制的实验中测试这些模型的描述能力。这些实验包括在计算机控制的实验室中实施模型的假设，参与者承担买家的角色，买家根据自己的表现获得金钱回报。在这些实验中做出的决定将被记录下来，观察到的行为与最优行为模型所规定的相比较，并识别观察到的行为和预测的行为之间的任何可复制的和系统的差异(例如，买家可能会推迟购买太长时间，或者，考虑到他们对未来价格路径的预期，可能会过早购买)。对买卖易腐烂商品的买卖双方在多个季节中的实际影响也将被引申出来。