Coordination and Learning in Market Entry Games

市场进入博弈中的协调和学习

• 批准号: 9512724
• 负责人: Amnon Rapoport
• 金额: $ 17.65万
• 依托单位: University of Arizona
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 1996
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 1996-04-01 至 2000-03-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=9512724&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Coordination; Learning; Market; Entry; Games

Coordination and Learning in Market Entry Games In non-cooperative games with multiple equilibria, a fundamental question is what causes players to expect each other to implement a specific equilibrium. Stated differently, it is important to understand what cues, in the context of the game, lead players to focus or anticipate one equilibrium outcome out of the multiplicity, and thus play so as to make their anticipations self-fulfilling. This study examines the possibility that in iterated games, coordination on a specific equilibrium may result through learning. To isolate the role of learning, other previously identified means of producing coordination (e.g., pre-play communication, equity considerations, and environmental cues) are controlled for.

市场进入博弈中的协调与学习在具有多重均衡的非合作博弈中，一个基本问题是什么导致参与者期望彼此实现特定的均衡。换句话说，重要的是要了解在游戏的背景下，什么线索导致玩家关注或预期多重均衡结果中的一个，从而使他们的预期自我实现。 本研究探讨的可能性，在迭代游戏中，协调一个特定的均衡可能会导致通过学习。 为了隔离学习的作用，其他先前确定的产生协调的手段（例如，游戏前的交流、公平考虑和环境提示）受到控制。