Coordination and Learning in Market Entry Games

在具有多重均衡的非合作博弈中，一个基本问题是，是什么导致玩家期望对方执行特定的均衡。换句话说，重要的是要理解在游戏环境中，是什么线索引导玩家从多样性中关注或预期一种平衡结果，从而让他们的预期自我实现。本研究考察了在迭代游戏中，特定平衡的协调可能通过学习产生的可能性。为了分离学习的作用，其他先前确定的产生协调的方法（例如，游戏前沟通，公平考虑和环境线索）被控制。

Coordination and Learning in Market Entry Games In non-cooperative games with multiple equilibria, a fundamental question is what causes players to expect each other to implement a specific equilibrium. Stated differently, it is important to understand what cues, in the context of the game, lead players to focus or anticipate one equilibrium outcome out of the multiplicity, and thus play so as to make their anticipations self-fulfilling. This study examines the possibility that in iterated games, coordination on a specific equilibrium may result through learning. To isolate the role of learning, other previously identified means of producing coordination (e.g., pre-play communication, equity considerations, and environmental cues) are controlled for.