Coordination and Learning in Market Entry Games

市场进入博弈中的协调与学习在具有多个均衡的非合作博弈中，一个基本的问题是，是什么导致参与者期望对方实现特定的均衡。换句话说，重要的是要理解在游戏的背景下，是什么线索引导玩家专注于或预期多样性中的一个均衡结果，从而进行游戏，从而使他们的预期自我实现。这项研究考察了在迭代游戏中，通过学习在特定均衡上进行协调的可能性。为了隔离学习的作用，控制了其他先前确定的产生协调的手段(例如，玩前沟通、公平考虑和环境线索)。

Coordination and Learning in Market Entry Games In non-cooperative games with multiple equilibria, a fundamental question is what causes players to expect each other to implement a specific equilibrium. Stated differently, it is important to understand what cues, in the context of the game, lead players to focus or anticipate one equilibrium outcome out of the multiplicity, and thus play so as to make their anticipations self-fulfilling. This study examines the possibility that in iterated games, coordination on a specific equilibrium may result through learning. To isolate the role of learning, other previously identified means of producing coordination (e.g., pre-play communication, equity considerations, and environmental cues) are controlled for.