U.S. Social Security Policy: A Dynamic Analysis of Incentives and Self-Selection

本研究项目的目的是适应一个动态的 作者提出的退休行为规划模型 和其他人开发的计算策略， 解决一些关于社会问题的重要问题 保障制度 需要解决的问题包括： (1)1983年社会保障法修正案将如何改变 影响退休行为？ 它会对 劳动力供给的老龄化？ (2)什么样的人会延迟自我选择 因为这些信贷的增加，退休信贷？ (3)新规则在精算意义上公平吗？ 会是什么 对社会保障总支出的净影响？ (4)更一般地说，什么是有效的社会形式 安全政策？ 这些问题将通过估计效用函数来解决 从退休历史中提取的一组男性工人的数据 调查. 这项研究很重要，因为它将回答 关于社会保障制度变化的影响的问题 系统的可行性和对接受者的好处。

The object of this research project is to adapt a dynamic programming model of retirement behavior developed by the author of this study and a computational strategy developed by others to address a number of important questions regarding the Social Security System. Among the questions to be addressed are: (1) How will changes in the 1983 Social Security amendments affect retirement behavior? How much will it affect the labor supply of older workers? (2) What kinds of individuals will self select delayed retirement credit because of increases in these credits? (3) Are the new rules fair in actuarial sense? What will be the net impact on total Social Security outlays? (4) More generally, what is the form of an efficient Social Security policy? These questions will be addressed by estimating utility functions with a data set of male workers taken from the Retirement History Survey. This research is important because it will answer questions about the impact of changes in the Social Security System on the viability of the system and on the benefits to recipient.