Collaborative Research: Communication and Coalitional Behavior

博弈论中最令人困惑的问题之一是如何分析参与者联盟对均衡的潜在偏离。这个项目将采用一种“新学”的方法来解决这个问题，也就是说，对谈判声明进行明确的建模，并研究它们的可信度。基于其他人的想法，这种方法非常强大，甚至在双人游戏中，它在某些情况下也会迫使一个人从平衡分析退回到合理模式。但在这种情况下，必须制定额外的“自然语言”假设，否则新词总是无能为力的（除非一个参与者被人为地沉默）。本研究的潜在应用是无限的：联盟形成的理论进展等待着许多应用领域的研究者，包括产业组织、法律经济学、金融和国际贸易。该项目还承诺在理解沟通、信号和重新谈判在社会环境中的作用方面提供重要的见解。

One of the most perplexing questions of game theory is how to analyze potential deviations from an equilibrium by a coalition of players. This project will take a "neologistic" approach to the problem, that is, to model negotiating statements explicitly, and to study their credibility. Based on ideas of others, the approach is so powerful that even in two player games, it forces one in some cases to retreat from equilibrium analysis to a rationalizable mode. But in such cases, additional "natural language" assumptions must be formulated, or else neologisms are always impotent (unless one player is artificially silenced). The potential applications to this research are unlimited: theoretical progress on coalition formation is awaited by researchers in many applied fields, including industrial organization, law and economics, finance, and international trade. The project also promises important insight in the understanding of the roles of communication, signalling and renegotiation in social settings.