Collaborative Research on Power and Unilateral Initiatives in Explicit Bargaining

本项目与SES 9109809 （Lawler）合作。这个项目继续并扩展了在以前的NSF资助下研究的讨价还价和威慑理论。这里测试的理论将双边威慑理论与单边积极主动的理论结合起来。正在经受考验的最重要的新观点是，双方之间的权力关系——特别是双方相互惩罚的高度能力——是和解倡议成功的条件。扩展理论在一系列实验室实验中得到验证，在这些实验中，各方讨价还价，交换出价和还价，同时也有能力对彼此征收惩罚性损害赔偿。结果确定了抽象的、一般的条件，在这些条件下，冲突双方可以在没有调解员或仲裁员干预的情况下进行调解。

This project is collaborative with SES 9109809 (Lawler). This project continues and extends a theory of bargaining and deterrence studied under previous NSF grants. The theory tested here integrates theories of bilateral deterrence with those of unilateral positive initiatives. The most important new idea under test is that power relations between parties - in par- ticular, high ability of both parties to punish each other - condition the success of conciliatory initiatives. The extended theory is tested in a series of laboratory experiments in which parties bargain, exchanging offers and counteroffers, while also having the capability to levy punitive damage on each other. Results identify abstract, general conditions under which con- flicting parties can produce conciliation without intervention of mediators or arbitrators.