Empirical Applications of Strategic Bargaining Models

这个项目延续了一系列关于讨价还价行为的研究。本研究的具体目的是将最近发展的与私人信息讨价还价的战略理论应用于工资解决方案和罢工持续时间的数据。本研究的更广泛目标是建立一个与事实一致的理论框架，并最终导致对集体谈判中重要政策问题的系统实证分析。其中一些政策问题包括如何处理罢工工人获得失业补偿和其他福利的资格，以及在罢工开始前规定一段冷静期的建议。该研究的核心是一个反复谈判的模型，在这个模型中，公司拥有包括短暂和永久成分的私人信息。该模型将应用于每一对谈判对谈判的劳动合同序列，以解释实证结果表明，上次合同谈判中的罢工发生率和持续时间对当前谈判中是否发生罢工有实质性影响。该模型将以美国和加拿大的劳动合同样本进行测试。

This project continues a line of research on bargaining behavior. The specific purpose of this study is to apply recently developed strategic theories of bargaining with private information to data on wage settlements and strike duration. The broader aim of this research is to develop a theoretical framework which is consistent with the facts, and which can eventually lead to systematic empirical analyses of important policy issues in collective bargaining. Some of these policy issues include the treatment of eligibility for unemployment compensation and other welfare benefits for striking workers, and proposals to mandate cooling off periods before a strike can commence. The core of the research is a model of repeated negotiations in which the firm has private information which includes both transient and permanent components. This model will be applied to a sequence of labor contracts negotiated by each bargaining pair with a view to explaining empirical results showing that strike incidence and duration in the last contract negotiation have a substantial effect on whether a strike occurs in the current negotiation. The model will be tested with a sample of U.S. and Canadian labor contracts.