The Political Economy of Natural Resource Use in Developing Countries: Selected Studies

本研究的目的是分析所有权或产权不安全对发展中国家自然资源使用的影响。所有权无保障的一个原因是政治和法律的制度不稳定。将进行几项实证研究，探讨政治动荡措施与自然资源开发和开采之间的关系。模型的开发，以确定不安全的所有权的激励措施，以开发资源，对开采资本的投资，并对资源回收的时间的影响。实证研究将侧重于商业伐木造成的毁林模式、投资于种植园林的激励因素、从森林获得的商业产品的组合、发展中国家化石燃料勘探的程度以及化石燃料资源的开采速度。关于政治机构在不同国家和不同时期的稳定性的数据被用来表明所有权的安全性。此外，还将分析所有权不安全对涉及自然和环境资产的交易频率和结构的影响。将研究的交易是债务换资源交换和涉及化石燃料勘探和开发权的合同。

The purpose of this research is to analyze the effect of insecure ownership or property rights on the use of natural resources in the developing world. One cause of ownership insecurity is volatile political and legal regimes. Several empirical studies will be undertaken to explore the relationships between measures of political volatility and natural resource development and extraction. Models are developed to identify the effect of insecure ownership on incentives to develop resources, on investment in extraction capital, and on the timing of resource recovery. The empirical studies will focus on the pattern of deforestation that results from commercial logging, the incentive to invest in plantation forests, the mix of commercial products obtained from forests, the extent of fossil fuel exploration in developing countries, and the rate at which fossil fuel resources are extracted. Data on the stability of political institutions, across countries and over time, are used to indicate ownership security. In addition, the effect of ownership insecurity on the frequency and structure of transactions involving natural and environmental assets will also be analyzed. The transactions to be studied are debt-for-resource swaps and contracts involving exploration and development rights for fossil fuels.