The Economics and Econometrics of Self-Selection with Applications to the Evaluation of Government Training Programs and to Understanding Sectoral Wage Inequality

9309525赫克曼这笔赠款补充了一项补助金的预算(SES-9111455)，以探索在评估政府培训计划对受训者的影响时出现的分析和实证问题。最初的研究基于正在进行的《就业培训伙伴法》(JTPA)评估中的独特数据。补充资金将允许从几个新的来源获取数据并完成新的任务，这将大大加强原提案中概述的研究。更具体地说，需要资金来收集国家确定的绩效标准的数据，这些标准影响了培训中心招收某些类别学员的激励措施。这些财政奖励计划是在公共领域，但在任何中央地点都不可用。了解这些激励措施，可以建立一个官僚决策模式，并对本身具有利害关系的激励措施作出反应。需要资金来整理和利用培训中心关于分包的丰富的新数据。这些中心使用与供应商的分包合同来转移不符合国家绩效标准的风险。已经获得了关于培训中心发出的合同和供应商提交的投标的宝贵数据来源。这些数据的分析将极大地帮助开发培训中心行为的行为模型。它还将为契约经济学的核心命题提供有价值的新证据。***

9309525 Heckman This grant supplements the budget of a grant (SES-9111455) to explore both analytical and empirical issues that arise in evaluating the impact of government training programs on trainees. The original study is based on unique data from an ongoing evaluation of the Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA). Supplemental funding would permit acquisition of data from several new sources and completion of new tasks that would greatly enhance the research outlined in the original proposal. More specifically, funds are requested to collect data on state- determined performance standards that affect training center incentives to enroll certain categories of trainees. These financial incentive schedules are in the public domain but are not available in any central location. Knowledge of these incentives permits construction of a model of bureaucratic decision making and response to incentives that is of interest in its own right. Funds are requested to collate and utilize a rich new body of data on subcontracting by training centers. These centers use subcontracts with their vendors to shift the risk of noncompliance with state performance standards. Access has been gained to a valuable source of data on contracts let by training centers and bids submitted by vendors. The analysis of these data will greatly aid in the development of a behavioral model of training center behavior. It will, also provide valuable new evidence on central propositions in the economics of contracting. ***