课题基金 / 基金详情

Matching in Centralized and Decentralized Labor Markets

Matching in Centralized and Decentralized Labor Markets
集中和分散劳动力市场的匹配
批准号:
9507791
负责人:
Alvin Roth
金额:
$32.76万
依托单位:
依托单位国家:
美国
项目类别:
Continuing Grant
财政年份:
1995
资助国家:
美国
项目状态:
已结题
起止时间:
1995-08-01 至 1999-05-24

项目摘要

项目成果

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中文摘要
翻译
9507791罗斯这个建议是对集中和分散劳动力市场中进行的匹配过程进行平行的理论和实证调查。它建立在事先得到国家科学基金会支持的调查基础上。迄今为止,调查的理论部分主要集中在“双边匹配”模型上。到目前为止,调查的实证部分包括对美国(包括进入专业领域)和英国(在英国,国家卫生服务的每个地区都有不同组织的市场运作)医生的入门级劳动力市场的研究,以及律师的入门级劳动力市场(法律伙伴关系的助理职位和联邦法院的助理职位);美国,以及加拿大的“文章”职位),牙医(特别是口腔外科医生,但也包括儿科牙医和牙周病医生),临床心理学家,以及日本精英大学的应届毕业生。非劳动力市场的匹配过程也被研究过,比如美国姐妹会和兄弟会的(不同)招聘过程,以及赛季后大学橄榄球碗的市场。最近调查中最引人注目的实证发现是,每一个市场在其历史上都有一段时间表现出交易时间解体的现象(“跳枪”),在这段时间里,市场交易出现得越来越早,以应对竞争,导致各种类型的市场失灵。这些不同市场目前的制度结构,其组织范围从几乎完全分散到几乎完全集中,在很大程度上是对这一历史的反应。过去的工作主要集中在对采用集中式市场清算机制的入门级市场进行分析和比较。本研究旨在分析分散劳动力市场,包括初级和高级劳动力市场,并将其与其他分散市场和集中市场的运作和匹配有效性进行比较。当前项目中的五大研究方向可以概括为:市场出清和去中心化市场的有效长度,即市场保持开放的时间,单个报价保持开放的时间,以及在之前的报价被拒绝后需要多长时间才能提出新的报价;去中心化市场是一种随机因素的匹配过程,例如,当不止一家公司试图通过电话联系某个特定的候选者时,哪家公司首先联系上了这个候选者;改善现有市场并设计新市场,以便更好地了解不同的市场监管如何相互结合,以及它们在特定环境下(如计算机辅助市场)单独或共同产生的激励和抑制作用;高级劳动力市场,即高度分散的市场,公司和工人开始匹配,而匹配因退休和新职位的产生而不稳定;向个别市场参与者提供建议,例如,通过揭示学生医生对医院的真实偏好顺序,是否符合其自身利益。
英文摘要
9507791 Roth This proposal is for parallel theoretical and empirical investigations into the matching processes which go on in centralized and decentralized labor markets. It builds on an investigation carried out with prior NSF support. The theoretical part of the investigation has so far focused on "two-sided matching" models. The empirical part of the investigation has so far included studies of the entry level labor markets for physicians in the US (including entry into specialties) and in Britain (where differently organized markets operate in each region of the National Health service), as well as entry level labor markets for lawyers (for associate positions in law partnerships and clerkships in Federal courts in ;the US, and for "articling" positions in Canada), dentists (particularly oral surgeons but also pediatric dentists and periodontists), clinical psychologists, and new graduates of elite Japanese universities. Matching processes which are not labor markets have also been studied, such as the (different) recruitment processes of American sororities and fraternities, and the market for post-season college football bowls. The most striking empirical discovery of the recent part of the investigation is that each of these markets has a period in its history which exhibited the phenomenon of unraveling of transaction times ("jumping the gun"), in which market transactions came earlier and earlier in response to competition, resulting in various types of market failure. The present institutional structure of each of these diverse markets, whose organizations range from almost completely decentralized to almost completely centralized, is in substantial part a response to this history. The past work concentrated on the analysis and comparison of entry level marketq which employ centralized market clearing mechanisms. The present investigation is intended to analyze decentralized labor markets, both entry level and senior level, and compare their operation and matching effectiv eness both with other decentralized markets and with centralized ones. The five broad lines of inquiry in the current project can be summarized as: Market clearing and the effective length of a decentralized market namely how long the market remains open, how long individual offers remain open, and how long it takes to make a new offer after a previous offer has been rejected; Decentralized markets as matching processes with random elements such as which firm reaches a given candidate first by telephone, when more than one is trying to do so; Improving existing markets and designing new ones in order to better understand how different market regulations work in combination with each other, and what incentives and disincentives they create singly and together in particular contexts such as computer assisted markets; Senior level labor markets namely highly decentralized markets in which firms and workers begin matched and matchings are destabilized by retirements and the creation of new positions; and Advice to individual market participants such as whether or not a student physician's self-interest is served by revealing her true preference order for hospitals.
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STANFORD INSTITUTE FOR THEORETICAL ECONOMICS SUMMER WORKSHOP
  • 批准号:
    1851941
  • 项目类别:
    Standard Grant
  • 资助金额:
    $42.48万
  • 财政年份:
    2019
  • 负责人:
    Alvin Roth
  • 依托单位:
WORKSHOP: Stanford Institute for Theoretical Economics Summer Workshop
  • 批准号:
    1559299
  • 项目类别:
    Standard Grant
  • 资助金额:
    $36.0万
  • 财政年份:
    2016
  • 负责人:
    Alvin Roth
  • 依托单位:
Collaborative Research on Kidney Exchange
Collaborative Research: Kidney Exchange
海外基金