Design of Markets

罗贝特·威尔逊·斯坦福大学SBR-9511209该提案包括四个涉及市场设计的项目。第一个项目涉及设计多物品拍卖和分配不可分割物品的多个单位的其他机制。将讨论的问题包括：(1)关于口头双向拍卖至少是某些偏好的“普遍机制”的猜想，以及(2)对一些试验性拍卖令人费解的结果的模拟。第二个项目继续了P.I.关于法律发现的博弈论分析的现有研究。第三个项目将研究多维机构设计。第四个项目继续了P.I.关于扩展形式游戏的行为策略的有效计算的当前研究。这将利用冯·斯坦格尔发现的一种方案，该方案在信息集的数量上是线性的。

Robept Wilson Stanford University SBR-9511209 The proposal consists of four projects involving the design of markets. The first project concerns the design of multi-item auctions and other mechanisms for allocating multiple units of an indivisible good. Among the issues that will be addressed are: (I) the conjecture that the oral double auction is a "universal mechanism" for at least some preferences, and (ii) the modeling of the puzzling outcomes of some experimental auctions. The second project continues current research by the P.I. on game theoretic analysis of legal discovery. The third project will study multidimensional mechanism design. The fourth project continues current research by the P.I. on the efficient computation of behavioral strategies of extensive-form games. This will make use of the discovery by von Stengel of a scheme that is linear in the number of information sets.