Group Formation and Commitment in Multi-Person Productive Exchange
Group Formation and Commitment in Multi-Person Productive Exchange
批准号:
9514860
负责人:
Edward Lawler
金额:
$0.0万
依托单位国家:
美国
项目类别:
Standard Grant
财政年份:
1996
资助国家:
美国
项目状态:
已结题
起止时间:
1996-04-15 至 1999-03-31
中文摘要
这是一个关于多人生产交换中群体形成的实验研究。它扩展了关系衔接理论,该理论是在涉及三个或更多的人的两人交换的研究中发展起来的,并纳入了重复交换的不确定性减少效应。理论论点是,当三个或三个以上的人协商共同利益的合作努力并反复这样做时,个人感觉到一个超越人与人之间关系的凝聚力群体,这种认知或心理群体的形成产生了对群体的更大承诺。这种群体形成过程表面上是因为同一群人之间的频繁交流产生了积极的感觉,减少了彼此之间的不确定性。多人交流使集团成为一股统一的力量,因为微妙的“二对一”压力可能会限制机会主义或渎职行为,并使谈判随着时间的推移变得更加常规。该理论将在一个实验环境中得到检验,在这个实验环境中,三个人可以协商一个合资企业,为每个人提供他们单独或二元交易无法产生的回报。每个人的利益取决于整个团队,而团队的努力需要每个人的同意。这是生产交换的一种形式,共同生产的商品是可分的,每个人都有要求尽可能多的这种商品的动机。该项目需要两个实验,操纵个人对群体的平均依赖(人与人之间的依赖),以及个人对群体的依赖之间是否存在差异(人对群体的依赖的平等或不平等)。主要的理论主张是,对群体的平均(总)依赖程度越高,个人对群体的依赖程度越平等,就会产生更多的协商协议,从而释放内生的群体形成过程。积极情绪和减少不确定性是这一内生过程中的关键时刻,因为它们应该增强对群体凝聚力的感知,从而产生承诺行为。每个实验都考察了一种不同形式的承诺行为。第一个调查的是成员之间象征性的(象征性的)礼物赠送。更强的承诺表现为群体中所有成员更倾向于给其他成员送象征性的礼物。第二个实验考察的是,如果每个成员都有机会主义或渎职的动机,他们是否会为新的合资企业出资。总而言之,该理论预测,在n人社会困境中,某些权力依赖条件会间接而不是直接影响成员相互赠送礼物的程度,以及他们对彼此的信任程度,从而做出贡献。该项目对多个实体的协作努力具有更广泛的含义,无论这些实体是个人、团体、组织还是社会。在良好的相对依赖和相互依赖下,人们不断地交换,开始将自己定义为一个群体,赋予群体自身价值,并更倾向于为群体和群体成员做事。承诺过程包括从工具性到表现性的个人与群体关系的转变。结果之一是在相互合作的期望中出现了初步的规范秩序。总的来说,这个项目提出了一种小规模社会秩序在多人交流中产生和维持的基本方式。
英文摘要
This is an experimental study of group formation in multi-person productive exchange. It extends the theory of relational cohesion, which was developed in studies of two-person exchange, involving three or more people and incorporating the uncertainty-reduction effects of repetitive exchange. The theoretical argument is that when three or more people negotiate jointly-beneficial collaborative efforts and do so repeatedly, individuals sense a cohesive group above and beyond person-to-person ties, and this cognitive or psychological group formation produces greater commitment to the group. This group formation process takes place ostensibly because frequent exchange among the same people produces positive feelings and reduces uncertainty about each other. Multi-person exchange makes the group a unifying force, because subtle "two against one" pressures are likely to constrain opportunism or malfeasance and make negotiations more routine over time. %%% The theory will be tested in an experimental setting in which three people can negotiate a joint venture that provides payoffs to each that they cannot produce alone or in dyadic transactions. Each person's profit is contingent on the group, and the group effort requires the assent of each person. This is a form of productive exchange, where the joint good produced is divisible, and each person has an incentive to claim as much of this good as possible. The project calls for two experiments, manipulating the average dependence of the individuals on the group (person-to-person dependence) and whether there is a difference between individuals' dependence on the group (equality or inequality of person-to-group dependence). The major theoretical propositions are that greater average (total) dependence on the group and more equal person-to-group dependencies produce more negotiated agreements which then unleash an endogenous group-formation process. Positive emotions and reduced uncertainty are key moments in this endogenous process, because these should enhance perceptions of group cohesion which, in turn, generate commitment behavior. %%% Each experiment examines a different form of commitment behavior. The first examines symbolic (token) gift giving among members. Stronger commitment is indicated by greater propensities for all members of the group to give token gifts to all others. The second experiment examines whether members will contribute to a new joint venture in which each has an incentive for opportunism or malfeasance. In sum, the theory predicts that certain power-dependence conditions will affect, indirectly rather than directly, the degree that members give each other gifts and the degree that they trust each other enough to contribute in an N-person social dilemma. %%% This project has broader implications for collaborative efforts of multiple entities, whether these are individuals, groups, organizations, or societies. Under favorable relative and mutual dependencies, people exchange repeatedly, come to define themselves as a group, ascribe value to the group itself, and become more inclined to do things for the group and its members. The commitment process involves movement from instrumental toward expressive person-to-group relations. One result is an incipient normative order manifest in mutual expectations of cooperation. Overall, this project suggests a fundamental way that small-scale social order comes about and is maintained in multi-person exchanges.
期刊论文(0)
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科研奖励(0)
会议论文
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国内基金
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