Doctoral Dissertation Research in Political Science: Institution Building in a New Democracy, Judicial Politics in Argentina, 1980-1996

这项研究调查了为什么法院有时会获得独立，并对其他政府部门施加制约，以及为什么它们有时无法获得这种能力。以阿根廷为例，研究人员确定了司法决策的趋势，并系统地测试了政治家增强或削弱司法独立的条件。这项研究使用了访谈、司法改革提案分析、国会辩论、法院任命和撤职以及阿根廷两家法院做出的裁决。后者编码了阿根廷最高法院在1980年至1996年和布宜诺斯艾利斯联邦上诉法院在1983年至1989年期间作出的裁决。这项研究指出，司法独立水平随着时间和问题的变化而变化，以及政府的相对权力和问题的政治敏感性的变化。这项关于阿根廷的研究结果对拉丁美洲内外司法机构软弱和依赖的其他新民主国家有影响。

This research investigates why courts sometimes gain independence and wield a check on other branches of government and why they sometimes fail to gain that capacity. Using the case of Argentina, the researcher identifies trends in judicial decision making and systematically tests the conditions under which politicians enhance or undermine judicial independence. This research uses interviews, analysis of judicial reform proposals, congressional debates, court appointments and removals and decisions handed down by two Argentine courts. This latter codes decisions handed down by the Argentine Supreme Court between 1980 and 1996 and the Buenos Aires Federal Appeals Court between 1983 and 1989. This research points to variations in levels of judicial independence over time and across issues, as well as variations in the relative power of the government and the political sensitivity of issues. The results of this study on Argentina have implications for other new democracies inside and outside of Latin America that suffer from weak and dependent judicial institutions.