Doctoral Dissertation: Legislative Behavior in Parliamentary Democracies

如果政治在议会民主制中发挥作用，那么政党在竞选活动中做出的承诺应该对其随后的执政政策产生系统性影响。 现有的议会政治研究未能充分解释这种联系是否存在以及在多大程度上存在。本研究将扩大范围的狭隘构建模型的联盟谈判的所有阶段的立法机关的决策活动，并转移到有前途的问题，如为什么党的行为，他们这样做的比较立法行为的传统分析的理论重点。 该项目将通过系统收集法国、德国、爱尔兰和荷兰议会民主国家的数据，推进比较立法机构的经验知识。 数据收集将需要长达一年的实地研究，审查立法程序。 计量经济学方法将被用来模拟复杂的关系，理论表明，立法谈判的特点。

If politics makes a difference in parliamentary democracies, then the promises political parties make during electoral campaigns should have a systematic impact on their subsequent policy making in office. Existing studies of parliamentary politics have failed to provide an adequate explanation of whether and to what degree this connection exists. This research will extend the scope of narrowly constructed models of coalition bargaining to all stages of policy making activity in the legislature and shift the theoretical focus of traditional analysis of comparative legislative behavior toward promising questions such as why parties behave as they do. The project will advance the empirical state of knowledge in comparative legislatures through the systematic collection of data across the parliamentary democracies of France, Germany, Ireland, and The Netherlands. Data collection will require year-long field research examining legislative proceedings. Econometric methods will be used to model the complex relationships that theory suggests should characterize legislative bargaining.