Collaborative Research on Variation in Legislative Entrepreneurship in Presidential Systems: Data from Beyond the U.S. Case

来自同一政党的立法者可以为特定的选区服务，他们可以共同努力，追求共同的纲领性目标，或者更常见的是，他们可以在两者之间的沿着连续体的某个地方取得平衡。 立法者为促进自己的选举生存而采取的企业家行为可以包括在会议厅打破党的纪律，发起以选区为重点的立法，寻求以地区为目标的委员会任务，以及向当地办事处和工作人员分配资源。 他们在多大程度上通过强调自己的个人属性（“个人投票”）来争取选票，这对代表权是具体的还是纲领性的、地区和教区的关切是否会下放给其他各级政府、部门间是否可能出现僵局和民主不稳定等问题都有深远的影响。 该项目衡量了四个拉丁美洲总统制民主国家的立法企业家精神：阿根廷，智利，哥伦比亚和委内瑞拉。 到目前为止，几乎所有关于创业的比较研究都只包括一个总统制国家的详细数据--美国。 虽然比较总统制和议会制很重要，但议会制中的行政和立法部门没有独立的选举来源，这一事实极大地改变了部门间关系的性质、代表制理论和创业前景。 研究人员使用在四个国家的实地工作期间收集的提名程序，选举制度和创业精神的数据来测试他们的假设。 由此产生的数据库的信息在立法机构内的行为进行了分析，采用定量和定性的方法，旨在利用立法企业家的差异，横截面和时间序列。 这项研究充实了最近开发的一个模型，用于解释立法者行为的可能性，并开发了一个研究设计，用于实证检验该模型。 研究结果应加强我们的政治家的制度激励的知识，并提供有关如何明确设计特定形式的代表，权力下放，和总统制的部门间关系的想法。 由此产生的数据库将对许多对该专题感兴趣的学者有用。

Legislators from the same party can entrepreneurially seek to serve particular constituencies, they can work together to pursue common programmatic goals, or they can more commonly, strike a balance somewhere along the continuum between the two. Entrepreneurial behavior by legislators to promote their own electoral survival can include breaking party discipline on the chamber floor, initiating constituency focused legislation, seeking district-targeted committee assignments, and allocating resources to local offices and staff. The extent to which they seek votes by stressing their own individual attributes (the `personal vote`) has profound consequences for whether representation will be particularistic or programmatic, whether or not regional and parochial concerns will be delegated to other levels of government, and whether or not interbranch stalemate and democratic instability are likely. This project measures legislative entrepreneurship in four Latin American presidential democracies: Argentina, Chile, Colombia, and Venezuela. Until now, virtually all comparative studies of entrepreneurship have included detailed data from only one presidential system - the United States. while comparing presidential and parliamentary systems is important, the fact that the executive and legislative branches in parliamentary systems do not have independent electoral origins dramatically changes the nature of interbranch relations, theories of representation, and the prospects for entrepreneurship. The researchers test their hypotheses using data on nomination procedures, electoral systems, and entrepreneurship collected during field work stays in each of the four countries. The resulting data base of information on behavior within legislative chambers is analyzed using quantitative and qualitative methodologies designed to exploit the variance in legislative entrepreneurship both cross-sectionally and time serially. The research fleshes out a recently developed model for explaining the likelihood that legislators will behave entrepreneurially and develops a research design for testing the model empirically. The findings should enhance our knowledge of the institutional incentives of politicians and offer ideas about how to explicitly design particular forms of representation, decentralization, and interbranch relations in presidential systems. The resulting data base will be of use to numerous scholars interested in the topic.