Institutional Interactions: The Impacts of Bicameralism and Presidential Powers on Legislative Structure

两院制立法倾向于促进政策稳定，可以代表民众的两种截然不同的特征，并可以改善多数主义的缺点。然而，许多关于民主政体决策的研究忽略了第二个议院的存在，这要么是为了简化建模任务，要么是为了最大限度地减少数据收集。正式的理论和经验文献都清楚地表明，仔细考虑第二议院的存在，可以极大地改变人们对如何实现政策结果的预期。这个项目将推进关于两美主义战略动态的理论，并收集数据来系统地测试从该理论得出的可观察到的含义。该项目的智力优势与其形式建模和实证分析的结合有关，以更好地理解两美主义的影响。学者们定义了两个特征来描述两院制的变化。一个关键因素是两院是否具有同等的宪法权力(对称)，或者上院是否从属于下院(不对称)。另一个关键因素是上议院相对于下议院的选举方式。该设计组件将确定成员的偏好是否可能一致或不一致。最近的学术研究表明，如果一个议院缺乏提案权力(这是不对称的一个例子)，该议院中的大多数人都有动机将看门权下放给没有代表性的代理人，这加剧了不一致。我们扩展了这一思路，以推断立法委员会制度的可观察到的影响。该项目将根据对立法机构和政策稳定性有影响的提议权和议程设置权，制定关于部门间和部门内关系的正式理论模型。测试这些模型需要收集关于腔室的相对力量(对称/不对称)和关键参与者之间的偏好分布(一致/不一致)的数据。与美国一样，拉丁美洲的民主制度是总统制，该地区一半的国家拥有两院制立法机构；它们是数据收集工作的重点。该项目的更广泛影响与体制设计对决策和民主化的重要性有关。更好地了解体制及其影响对于建立稳定的民主体制十分重要。该项目将提供有关上议院的数据，使学者和从业人员能够评估机构设计如何影响结果。

Bicameral legislatures tend to promote policy stability, can represent two distinct characterizations of the populace, and can ameliorate the shortcomings of majoritarianism. However, many studies of policy making in democratic regimes ignore the existence of a second chamber, either to simplify the modeling task or to minimize data collection. Both formal theoretical and empirical literatures have made clear that carefully accounting for the existence of a second chamber can dramatically alter expectations about how policy outcomes are achieved. This project will advance theorizing on the strategic dynamics of bicameralism and collect data to systematically test the observable implications derived from that theorizing.The intellectual merit of this project is connected to its combination of formal modeling and empirical analysis to better understand the effects of bicameralism. Scholars have defined two features for characterizing the variation in bicameral systems. One key element is whether both chambers have equal constitutional powers (symmetry) or if the upper chamber is subordinated to the lower chamber (asymmetry). Another key element is how the upper chamber is elected relative to the lower chamber. This design component will determine whether the preferences of members are likely to be congruent or incongruent. Recent scholarship has suggested that where one chamber lacks proposal power (an example of asymmetry), the majority in that chamber has an incentive to delegate gatekeeping power to an unrepresentative agent, heightening incongruence. We extend this thinking to deduce observable implications for legislative committee systems. The project will develop formal theoretical models of interbranch and intrabranch relations based on proposal rights and agenda-setting power with implications for legislative institutions and policy stability. Testing these models requires the collection of data on the relative powers of chambers (symmetry/asymmetry) and the distribution of preferences across pivotal players (congruence/incongruence). Like the U.S., the democratic regimes of Latin America are presidential systems and half of the countries in the region have bicameral legislatures; they are the focus of data collection efforts. The broader impacts of the project are related to the importance of institutional design for policy-making and democratization. Better understanding institutions and their effects is important to establishing stable democratic institutions. The project will make available data on upper chambers, allowing scholars and practitioners to evaluate how institutional design affects outcomes.