Doctoral Dissertation Research in Political Science: The Political Economy of Privatization

经济改革的政治经济学一直是比较研究的一个丰富的主题，强调了改革的困难，因为它有着直接的、集中的成本和长期的、分散的利益（Haggard and考夫曼，1992;纳尔逊，1993;威廉姆森，1998）。根深蒂固的利益预期会对政治家施加压力，阻碍改革，特别是在机构薄弱、政策制定者绝缘性差和权力分散集中的国家（纳尔逊，1990;普兹沃斯基，1991;沃特伯里，1992）。然而，经验证据表明，以前的研究在理论上是错误的;尽管预期会遭到反对，但各国还是推行并维持了经济改革。是什么原因导致了改革的引入和实施的差异？拟议的研究探讨这一问题，探讨在新自由主义改革包的一个元素的变化：私有化。为了理解各国经验为何如此不同，应分析改革一揽子方案的个别要素（例如，税收改革、贸易政策、财政政策）必须作为不同的政策加以审查，然后重新组合，以全面了解改革的政治经济学。拟议的研究项目建立在经济改革领域的理论工作，以开发一个多因果理论模型进行实证检验。该项目有三个目标：第一，确定国际因素如何与国内特点相互作用，影响私有化机构的建立;第二，分析寻求和实现私有化的国内环境，以查明对公营企业转移影响最大的因素;第三，深入研究本地环境，以找出统计分析所发现的成因。为了完成这些目标，收集了1975-1995年货币基金组织183个成员国建立私有化机构的情况、墨西哥和巴西的个别私有化情况和国有企业的情况。两个统计模型的创建和测试使用生存分析，一个统计技术，适用于有关事件发生的原因，通过时间的问题。第一个模型考察了国家建立私有化机构需要多长时间;第二个模型考察了国有企业何时被出售给私人利益。围绕在墨西哥和巴西的私有化的国内环境的定性分析嵌套在研究中，以提供更深入的了解私有化事件。该项目的更广泛用途包括收集的数据。 它可以用来研究国际压力和规范是如何与国内特点相互作用，影响任何国家，N的私有化机构的发生，然后是什么因素影响利益从公共部门转移到私营部门。总之，这些组成部分的拟议研究提供了一个更清晰的理解，为什么私有化是由国家和什么因素影响其实施，进一步阐明了我们的理解的政治经济学的经济改革。

The political economy of economic reform has been a fertile topic for comparative research, emphasizing the difficulties of reform given immediate, concentrated costs and long-term, diffuse benefits (Haggard and Kaufman 1992; Nelson, 1993; Williamson 1998). Entrenched interests are expected to pressure politicians and impede reforms, particularly in states with weak institutions, poorly insulated policy makers, and a diffuse concentration of power (Nelson 1990; Przeworski 1991; Waterbury 1992). However, the empirical evidence suggests that previous research has been theoretically misspecified; countries have introduced and sustained economic reforms despite expected opposition. What accounts for the variation in the introduction and implementation of reforms? The proposed research examine this question by exploring the variation in one element of the neoliberal reform package: privatization. To understand why countries have such varied experiences, individual elements of reform packages (e.g., tax reform, trade policy, fiscal policy) must be examined as distinct policies, and then reassembled to gain a complete understanding of the political economy of reform. The proposed research project builds on the theoretical work in the field of economic reform to develop a multi-causal theoretical model to be tested empirically. The objectives of the project are threefold: first, to determine how international factors are interacting with domestic characteristics to affect the creation of privatization agencies; second, to analyze the domestic environment in which privatizations are sought and realized to identify those factors that most significantly impact the transfer of public enterprises; and third, to examine the domestic environment in-depth to unearth the causal processes identified in the statistical analyses. To complete these objectives, data are gathered on the creation of privatization agencies from 1975-1995 in the 183 IMF-member countries, on individual privatizations and on state-owned enterprises in Mexico and Brazil. Two statistical models are created and tested using survival analysis, a statistical technique appropriate for questions concerning the causes of events occurring through time. The first model examines how long countries take to create privatization agencies; the second examines when state-owned enterprises are sold to private interests. A qualitative analysis of the domestic environment surrounding privatization in Mexico and Brazil is nested within the study to provide greater insight into the privatization event. The broader uses of this project include the collected data. It could be used to examine how international pressures and norms are interacting with domestic characteristics to affect the occurrence of privatization agencies in any country, N, and then what factors affect the transfer of interests from the public to the private sector. Together, these components of the proposed research provide a clearer understanding of why privatization is sought by states and what factors affect its implementation, further elucidating our understanding of the political economy of economic reform.