Axiomatic and Strategic Analysis of Allocation: Theory and Applications

本课题的目的是识别和构建具有公平性和不可操纵性的分配规则。这项研究的中心是：所有行动者都受益于扩大共同拥有的资源，更广泛地说，受益于扩大向整个社会开放的机会；每个行为人都从他的禀赋或生产力的扩大中获益；所有主体的福利都在同一个方向上受到环境变化的影响，而环境变化是没有人能够控制的（由于环境变化，他们要么获利，要么亏损）；额外代理人的到来，当它具有社会成本时，意味着最初在场的所有代理人的福利损失；分配的可取性不受某些代理人随任务离开的影响；最后，如果两个经济体有一组共同的代理人，选择两种分配方式，这些代理人获得相同的总资源，那么他们每个人在两种情况下都获得相同的资源。该程序的策略部分侧重于agent不应通过歪曲其控制的信息而获得的要求，并且它包括面对不完整信息时可实现性的相关属性。我们的分配问题的可能应用如下：将资源划分为代理人对其拥有的索赔的函数（相当于，评估税收负债作为代理人控制的单个资源的函数）；当座席的需要是嵌套的，以及当必须兴建公共设施以容纳最需要的座席时（例如所谓的“机场”问题），分配公共设施的成本；当代理人的需求重叠时，例如当他们分布在空间（沿路的商业）或时间（重叠的世代）时，分配公共设施的成本；分配网络的费用，如道路网络或电力网络；随时间分配服务（排序和调度）；在标准经济中分配私人物品。

The aim of this project is the identification and the construction of allocation rules enjoying properties of fairness and non-manipulability. Central to the study are the following: all agents benefit from an enlargement of resources held in common, more generally of opportunities open to society as a whole; each agent benefits from an enlargement of his endowment, or of his productivity; the welfare of all agents is affected in the same direction by changes in the environment over which no one in particular has control (they all gain or they all lose as a result of the change); the arrival of additional agents, when it is socially costly, implies a welfare loss for all agents initially present; the desirability of an allocation is not affected by the departure of some agents with their assignments; finally, if for two economies having a group of agents in common, two allocations are chosen at which these agents receive the same aggregate resource, then each of them individually receives the same thing in both. The strategic component of the program focuses on the requirement that agents should never gain by misrepresenting the information they control, and it includes related properties of implementability in the face of incomplete information.The possible applications of our allocation problem are the following: dividing a resource as a function of claims agents have on it (equivalently, assessing tax liabilities as a function of individual resources agents control); allocating the cost of a public facility when agents' needs are nested and when the facility has to be built so as to accommodate the agents with the greatest need (exemplified by the so-called ``airport" problem); allocating the cost of a public facility when agents' needs overlap, such as when they are distributed in space (businesses along a road) or time (overlapping generations); allocating the cost of a network, such as a road network or an electrical network; allocating a service over time (sequencing and scheduling); allocating private goods in standard economies.