Religious Radicals and Fertility: An Economic Approach

这个项目研究宗教激进主义的经济和人口统计学，特别是在伊斯兰教。激进的伊斯兰教是一股方兴未艾的地缘政治力量。与基督教再洗礼教派和犹太极端正统派一样，激进伊斯兰教是相对较新的宗教创新。它出现在20世纪中叶，历史学家将其描述为对世俗的、市场驱动的西方文化入侵传统社会的反应。就像那些基督教和犹太教教派一样，它的增长对经济学家来说是一个悖论。随着市场增加时间的影子价值，价格理论预测了时间效率形式的宗教实践的演变。然而，一个坚持越来越耗时的修行版本的宗教派别正在演变，但矛盾的是，它却蓬勃发展。与激进的基督教和犹太教教派一样，激进伊斯兰教的显著增长在一定程度上要归功于高生育率，特别是与占多数的主流穆斯林的生育率下降形成鲜明对比。这项研究做出并探索了四个论点的后果：第一，激进宗教团体的形成有一个源自俱乐部理论的经济学解释，该理论使日益严格的实践和高(甚至是上升的)生育率合理化。其次，有强有力的证据表明，激进的宗教团体可以提高生育率。在过去的20年里，至少有三个群体经历了长期的生育率上升：伊朗人、巴勒斯坦人和极端正统派犹太人。在传统和世俗化群体生育率转变的背景下，激进宗教群体的高生育率可能会破坏穆斯林世界的政治稳定和经济发展。第三，我建议通过将宗教归属指标与家庭调查的微观数据联系起来，估计激进宗教团体不同生育率的大小。家庭调查报告了经济变量和生育率。这使得对激进宗教团体的补贴具有强烈亲和力的假设得到了检验。以色列极端正统派犹太人、以色列的穆斯林兄弟会、印度尼西亚的穆斯林宗教社区学校和巴勒斯坦的穆斯林兄弟会四个案例说明了这些程序的可行性。在第一种情况下，报告了已完成工作的结果，在接下来的两种情况下，给出了初步结果。最后，生育是激进宗教团体影响行为的一种很容易量化的方式，但不是唯一的方式。我还审查了塔利班和哈马斯等宗教派别在运作民兵和派遣自杀式炸弹袭击者方面的优势。这一优势可以解释为什么激进宗教派别如此频繁地转向暴力行动。

This project studies the economics and demographics of religious radicalism, particularly in Islam. Radical Islam is an ascendant geopolitical force. Like the Christian Anabaptist sects and the Jewish Ultra-Orthodox, Radical Islam is a relatively recent religious innovation. It arose in the mid 20th century in what historians describe as a reaction to the incursion of secular, market driven, Western culture into traditional society. Like those Christian and Jewish sects its growth represents a paradox to economists. As markets increase the shadow value of time price theory predicts the evolution of time-efficient forms of religious practice. Yet a religious sect evolves which insists on an increasingly time-intensive version of practice, and paradoxically it flourishes. Like radical Christian and Jewish sects, radical Islam owes part of its remarkable growth to high fertility, especially in contrast to the fertility decline of the mainstream Muslim majority. This research makes and explores the consequences of four arguments: First, the formation of radical religious groups has an economic explanation derived from the theory of clubs, which rationalizse both the increased stringency of practice and high (or even rising) fertility. Second, there is strong evidence that radical religious groups can raise fertility rates. At least three groups have experienced protracted episodes of fertility increases over the past 20 years: Iranians, Palestinians and Ultra-Orthodox Jews. High fertility among the radical religious, against a background of fertility transition among traditional and secularizing groups could undermine political stability and economic development in the Muslim world. Third, I propose estimating the size of differential fertility rates of radical religious groups by linking indicators of religious affiliation to micro data from household surveys which report on economic variables and fertility. This allows a test of the hypothesis that subsidies to radical religious groups are strongly pronatalist. The feasibility of these procedures is illustrated in four cases, Israeli Ultra-Orthodox Jews, the Muslim Brothers in Israel, Muslim religious community schools in Indonesia and the Muslim Brothers in Palestine. In the first case results from completed work are reported and in the next two preliminary results are given. Finally, fertility is an easily quantified way that radical religious groups affect behavior, but not the only way. I also examine the advantage of religious sects such as the Taliban and Hamas in operating militias and in dispatching suicide bombers. This advantage can explain why radical religious sects so often turn to violent action.