Religiosity and Fertility Decline Among European Catholics

智力优势南欧的生育率远低于更替水平，平均每个妇女一生生育1.4个孩子。低生育率和低女性劳动力参与率的空前结合挑战了传统的经济人口学理论。其他因素，如教育程度的提高和儿童死亡率的降低，几乎不能解释最近生育率的下降。该提案提供的证据表明，自20世纪60年代以来，天主教虔诚度的下降是意大利、西班牙、葡萄牙和爱尔兰随后生育率下降的主要原因——自20世纪70年代中期以来，每个妇女的生育率下降了一个多孩子。此外，我们的初步结果表明，这种下降主要不是由宗教导致的对儿童偏好的改变引起的。相反，制度的衰落和社会影响似乎更为重要，例如许多传统上由天主教社区提供的儿童友好社会服务的丧失，包括学校、医院、日托所和社交俱乐部。服务的减少反过来又与20世纪60年代中期第二届梵蒂冈大公会议的重大改革后修女和神父的大量流失有关。为了调查天主教社区提供的社会服务（有形的和精神的）变化对生育率的影响，PI建议将生育率和经济变量的数据与天主教社区的宗教信仰和社会服务提供的指标合并。本提案提出了来自欧洲国家小组和意大利近期数据横截面的初步结果。该项目将极大地扩展这种分析。ThePI将获取和分析以下数据：在ISSP调查的32个国家的天主教宗教团体；美国和加拿大的区域天主教社区；以及世界价值观调查所涵盖的其他国家的宗教团体，但不包括ISSP。更广泛的影响了解社会服务如何影响生育率对于了解欧洲天主教徒的生育率趋势和预测下一代欧洲人口结构可能至关重要。此外，其影响超出了欧洲的5亿居民，甚至超出了全世界的10亿天主教徒。欠发达国家的民众和领导人把目光投向欧洲，想知道日益繁荣的经济和大量女性劳动力市场的参与是否必然意味着人口老龄化和人口下降。如果像我们推测的那样，天主教欧洲生育率的迅速下降与其说是由于经济发展，不如说是由于教会提供的家庭友好型社会服务的丧失，那么这些推论可能是不合理的。如果PI的推测得到进一步分析的证实，它将对公共政策产生重要影响。宗教团体可能在某些时间和地点强烈支持提供社会服务，但在不断变化或不同的文化中，可能需要非常不同的体制安排来支持他们继续提供社会服务。因此，PI的结论可能对任何面临快速经济和社会变革的社会都很重要，特别是对那些妇女在劳动力市场机会和她们对儿童保育施加的高额影子成本之间日益进退两难的社会。如果来自宗教团体、其他社会网络、市场或政府的支持越少，这种紧张关系可能会更大。

Intellectual MeritFertility rates are far below replacement in Southern Europe, averaging 1.4 lifetime children per woman. The unprecedented combination of low fertility and low female labor force participation challenges conventional theories of economic demography. Other factors such as increased education and reduced child mortality explain almost none of this recent fertility decline. The proposal provides evidence that a decline in Catholic religiosity since the 1960s has been a major cause of subsequent fertility decline in Italy, Spain, Portugal and Ireland - a decline of over a child per woman since the mid 1970s. Moreover, our preliminary results imply that this decline was not primarily caused by religiously-induced change in preferences for children. Instead, institutional decline and social effects appear to be much more important, such as the loss of many child-friendly social services traditionally provided by Catholic communities, including schools, hospitals, day care, and social clubs. Reduced services were, in turn, linked to the large attrition of nuns and priests that followed the major reforms of the Second Vatican Council in the mid-1960s. In order to investigate the fertility effects of change in social services (both tangible and psychic) provided by Catholic communities, the PI's propose to merge data on fertility and economic variables with indicators of religiosity and social service provision in Catholic communities. This proposal presents the preliminary results, both from a panel of European countries and from a cross-section of recent Italian data. The project will greatly expand this analysis. ThePI's will obtain and analyze data for: Catholic religious communities in the 32 countries surveyed by the ISSP; regional Catholic communities in the U.S. and Canada; and religious communities in additional countries covered by the World Values Survey but not the ISSP.Broader ImpactsUnderstanding how social service provision affects fertility may be critical to understanding fertility trends among European Catholics and to projecting European demographics over the next generation. Moreover, the implications extend beyond the half-billion residents of Europe or even the billion Catholics worldwide. The populations and leaders of less developed countries look to Europe and wonder whether increased prosperity and greatly female labor market participation inevitably imply greying populations and demographic decline. These inferences may not be warranted if, as we conjecture, rapid fertility decline in Catholic Europe is not so much due to economic development as it is due to the loss of Church-provided family-friendly social services. If the PI's conjecture is borne out by further analysis it has important public policy implications. Religious groups may strongly support social service provision in some times and places, but very different institutional arrangements may be required to support their continued provision in changing or different cultures. The PI's conclusions might therefore be important for any society facing rapid economic and social change, and especially for societies in which women are increasingly torn between labor market opportunities and the high shadow cost they impose on child care. That tension may be much greater the less support is available from religious communities, other social networks, markets, or governments.