Designing Competitive Markets for Transmission and Generation Expansion

美国联邦能源管理委员会（FERC）在其《标准市场设计规则制定提案通知》中概述了三个主要政策目标：(1)确保电网的高效实时运行；(2)监控和缓解市场力量；(3)促进高效的输电和发电扩张。FERC已指示区域交易组织在日前市场和金融传输权中使用基于竞争的位置边际（能源）价格，以努力实现目标(1)和(2)。委员会希望看到市场力量的影响扩展到他们的第三个（也是最重要的）目标：有效的输电和发电扩张。很明显，如果没有有效和充分的传输和发电扩张，实时能源市场将遭受严重的传输拥堵和发电市场力量的行使，从而导致高能量价格。这些扩大市场应采取何种形式，以及它们与集中规划过程的关系尚未决定，而且不确定。可以肯定的是，在考虑竞争市场的扩张时，FERC在理论和实践上都在探索以前未开发的领域。拍卖已被引入并用于日前能源市场的运作。因此，人们自然会问，它们的成功是否能延伸到输电和发电扩张领域。尽管拍卖在越来越多的行业和市场环境中得到了应用，但对拍卖理论的研究却严重滞后。本文的研究目标是通过提高输电和扩产拍卖机制设计的知识水平，缩小实践与理论之间的差距。通过本项目，我们打算通过表征和研究用于发电和输电扩张的双边组合拍卖，为组合拍卖的稀缺文献做出贡献。o开发计算机辅助建模工具，以了解拍卖形式选择对业绩（公平、效率、平衡和出价膨胀）的影响。o了解在各种反馈机制下计算复杂性和拍卖性能之间的权衡。o探索市场在多大程度上可以有效地取代发电和输电扩张领域的监管规划过程。本提案中概述的工作的更广泛影响包括开发新的见解和工具，通过市场模拟，将帮助监管机构应对设计扩张市场的挑战。这个项目的智力优势在于将运筹学、经济学和电气工程的研究领域结合起来，开发出一种综合的方法来设计扩展拍卖。传统上，运筹学和电气工程方面的文献中一直充斥着试图捕获尽可能多的操作和物理细节的模型。与之形成鲜明对比的是，经济学家通常牺牲了操作细节，而更加强调市场中代理人的战略行为。我们的研究目标是在能源拍卖研究中融合这两种意识形态方法。基于电网的直流潮流近似，我们将开发仿真工具和计算算法，以评估在各种市场情景下存在战略投标人行为的组合扩展拍卖的性能。虽然这种跨学科的方法提出了重大的挑战，但它带来了巨大的回报，即在设计有效输电和发电扩展的组合拍卖时，对挑战和潜在回报有了更深入的了解。

With their Standard Market Design Notice Of Proposed Rulemaking, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) has outlined three main policy objectives: (1) ensure efficient real-time operation of the grid, (2) monitor and mitigate market power, and (3) promote efficient transmission and generation expansion. FERC has directed regional trading organization to use competitive-based location marginal (energy) prices in the day-ahead market and financial transmission rights in an effort to achieve objectives (1) and (2). The Commission would like to see the influence of market forces extend to their third (and arguable most important) objective: efficient transmission and generation expansion. It is clear that without efficient and adequate transmission and generation expansion, the real-time energy markets will suffer from significant transmission congestion and the exercise of generation market power, resulting in high-energy prices. The form these markets for expansion should take, and their relationship to centralized planning processes has yet to be decided and is uncertain. What is certain is that in considering competitive markets for expansion, FERC is delving into previously unexplored territory, both in theory and in practice.Auctions have been introduced and used in the operation of the day-ahead energy markets. Therefore, it is natural to ask if their success can extend to the realm of transmission and generation expansion. While the use of auctions has been applied in an increasing variety of industries and market settings, the research in auction theory has severely lagged behind. It is the goal of this research proposal to close the gap between practice and theory by advancing the state of the knowledge in the design of auction mechanisms for transmission and generation expansion. With this project, we intend to:o Contribute to the scarce literature in combinatorial auctions by characterizing and studying a two-sided combinatorial auction for generation and transmission expansion.o Develop computer aided modeling tools to understand the impact of auction format selection on performance (equity, efficiency, equilibrium and bid inflation).o Understand the trade-offs between computational complexity and auction performance under various feedback mechanisms.o Explore to what degree markets can efficiently replace regulatory planning processes in the domain of generation and transmission expansion.The broader impact of the work outlined in this proposal includes the development of new insights and tools that, via market simulation, will aid the regulators as they grapple with the challenges of designing expansion markets. The intellectual merit of this project is to combine fields of study from operations research, economics and electrical engineering to develop an integrative approach to the design of expansion auctions. Traditionally, the literature in operations research and electrical engineering has been rich with models that try to capture as much operational and physical detail as possible. In sharp contrast, economists have generally sacrificed operational details and placed a greater emphasis on the strategic behavior of agents in a market. The goal of our research is to fuse these two ideological approaches in the study of energy auctions. Building on a DC power flow approximation of a grid, we will develop simulation tools and computational algorithms to evaluate the performance of combinatorial expansion auctions in the presence of strategic bidder behavior under various market scenarios. While this interdisciplinary approach presents a significant challenge, it holds the great reward of developing a deeper understanding the challenges and potential rewards in designing combinatorial auctions for efficient transmission and generation expansion.