Collaborative Research: Decision-Making on Behalf of Others

在现代社会中，数量惊人的重要决策是由一个人代表其他人做出的。首席执行官们代表公司的员工、牧师代表他们的会众、将军代表他们的军队、教师代表他们的学生、帮派头目代表他们的追随者、父母代表他们的家庭、公司董事会成员代表股东、律师代表他们的客户，或许最明显的是，代表他们所代表的选民的选举产生的代表。尽管决策专业的学生对那些代表自己行事的人做出的决策有着令人印象深刻的理解，但还没有对代表他人做出的决策与在传统的二元背景下做出的决策有何不同的确切方式进行分析。在这项研究项目中，研究人员利用一系列实验来隔离，从而确定当决定是以他人的名义做出时，决定的不同方式。在一个说明性的实验中，受试者被给予20美元，并被告知以任何方式与第二个玩家平分这笔钱。从现有的利用单枪独裁者和最后通牒游戏的研究中，我们知道受试者通常会把近一半的钱给他们的匿名伴侣。但尚不清楚，当受试者代表他人行事时，这种慷慨会在多大程度上受到限制(或增强)。如果改变实验的结构，让一名受试者代表一个五人小组(包括受试者)行事，并必须决定如何在他/她自己的小组和第二个(接收)小组之间分配100美元(5x20美元)，而一个小组内的所有成员都收到相同的数额，那么决定可能会不同。确定这两个共同且重要的决策安排之间行为差异的确切性质是本项目的中心目标。该项目的学术价值在于，它对决策的领先理论模型的适用条件提供了明确的实证检验。例如，最纯粹形式的理性选择模型源自微观经济学，它假设决策者总是试图最大化他们的短期有形收益，当人们代表自己行事时，这一预期往往被证明是错误的。但第二个理论来自社会和进化心理学，并被用于当前的项目，它强调人们对他人如何看待自己的关注，因此导致了一种预期，具有讽刺意味的是，决策者将更多地保护他人的资源，而不是他们自己的资源。因此，这项研究很有希望确定领先决策模型适用的确切条件。这项研究具有更广泛和更实际的影响，帮助公民、改革者和决策者本身了解在各种现实生活背景下对决策者施加的心理压力。假设实验的结果如预期的那样，如果短期收益最大化是期望的目标，那么授权给代表就成为最有成效的方法。然而，如果希望决策者分享并参与利他主义的惩罚，明智的做法是让人们为自己做决定。

A surprising number of the important decisions in modern society are undertaken by one person on behalf of other people. CEOs make decisions on behalf of employees in the firm; pastors on behalf of their congregations; generals on behalf of their troops; teachers on behalf of their students; gang leaders on behalf of their followers; parents on behalf of their family; members of corporate boards on behalf of shareholders; lawyers on behalf of their clients; and perhaps most obviously, elected representatives on behalf of the constituents they represent. Though students of decision-making have an impressive understanding of decisions made by those acting on their own behalf, an analysis has yet to be undertaken of the precise manner in which decisions taken on behalf of others differ from those occurring in a traditional dyadic context. In this research project, the investigators employ a series of experiments to isolate and thereby to ascertain the manner in which decisions are different when they are made on someone else's behalf. In an illustrative experiment, a subject is given $20 and told to divide it with a second player in any fashion. From existing research utilizing single-shot dictator and ultimatum games it is known that subjects typically give nearly half to their anonymous partner. But not known is the extent to which this generosity is curtailed (or enhanced) when subjects are acting on behalf of others. If the structure of the experiment is modified so that a subject acts on behalf of a group of five people (including the subject) and must decide how to allocate $100 (5 x $20) between his/her own group and a second (receiving) group, with all members within a group receiving the same amount, decisions are likely to be different. Identifying the precise nature of the difference in behavior between these two common and important decision arrangements is the central goal of this project. The intellectual merit of the project is that it provides a clear empirical test of the conditions under which leading theoretical models of decision-making apply. For example, the purest form of the rational choice model, drawn from microeconomics, hypothesizes that decision-makers will always attempt to maximize their short-term tangible gains, an expectation that often turns out to be false when people are acting on behalf of themselves. But a second theory, drawn from social and evolutionary psychology and utilized in the current project, emphasizes people's concern for the way others perceive them and therefore leads to the expectation that, somewhat ironically, decision-makers will be more protective of the resources of others than they are of their own. As such, the research holds considerable promise of determining the precise conditions under which leading models of decision-making apply. The research has a broader and more practical impact by helping citizens, reformers, and decision-makers themselves to understand the psychological pressures acting on decision-makers in various real-life contexts. Assuming the results of the experiments are as anticipated, if maximization of short-term gains is the desired goal, giving authority to representatives becomes the most fruitful approach. If, however, the desire is for decision-makers to share and to engage in altruistic punishment, the sensible thing to do is to let people make decisions for themselves.