Charitable Giving and Fundraising

90%的美国家庭都向慈善机构捐款，平均每年捐款超过1,500美元。 不难看出，慈善捐款是美国经济的重要组成部分。此外，目前的公共政策表明，我们将越来越依赖这种捐款。 因此，重要的是我们要了解什么触发给予。 然而，长期以来，慈善捐赠对经济行为的标准模型构成了挑战。 顾问和非营利组织经理推荐了许多鼓励捐款的方法，但这些方法很少（如果有的话）经过实际测试。该项目将开发一种新的慈善捐款模式，以更好地解释人们如何以及为什么向慈善机构捐款。 特别是，该模型不仅包括捐赠者和慈善机构，还包括多个慈善机构和筹款人，作为人们和慈善机构之间的中介。 我们的目标是提高我们对一种重要的合作行为以及支持这种合作的机构的理解。 这项研究的更广泛的影响将有利于慈善机构，为他们提供更好的信息，最好的筹款方法。本项目的三个部分将研究筹款行为，多个慈善机构，合作行为。慈善捐赠模式的共同假设是捐赠者同时捐款，慈善机构扮演纯粹被动的角色。然而，通常情况下，竞选活动是由筹款人指导和指挥的-往往是非常活跃的筹款人。建议书第一部分的工作扩展了给予的模式，以解释这一事实。特别是，这项工作将考虑羊群效应或对地位的关注是否可能是宣布捐款的原因。另一个常用的策略是筹款人为慈善机构的合并捐款设定门槛或目标，我们也将调查这种策略的含义。提案的第二部分放宽了只有一个慈善机构的标准假设。考虑到多个慈善机构，我首先确定当一组异质的慈善机构可用时，预测的总捐款是否会增加，然后当捐助者为不同和重叠的公共产品捐款时，搭便车行为是否会更突出或更不突出。最后，在第三部分的工作建议中研究了合作行为。特别是，我们研究学习，互惠和游戏结束的影响可以解释的程度，合作随着时间的推移而减少。 我们还研究了什么样的机构做得最多，以鼓励合作。

Ninety percent of all U.S.households contribute to charities, with average contributions in excess of $1,500 per year. It is easy to see that charitable contributions constitute an important component of the American economy. Furthermore current public policy makes it clear that we increasingly will be relying on such donations. It is therefore important that we understand what triggers giving. However, charitable giving has long posed a challenge for standard models of economic behavior. Consultants and nonprofit managers recommend many methods to encourage donations, but few if any of these methods are actually tested against alternatives.This project will develop a new model of charitable donations to better explain how and why people give to charity. In particular, the model includes not just donors and a charity, but includes multiple charities and fundraisers that serve as intermediaries between people and charities. The goal is to improve our understanding of an important kind of cooperative behavior and the institutions that support such cooperation. Broader implications of this research will benefit charities by giving them better information about the best fundraising methods.The three parts of this project will examine fundraising behavior, multiple charities, and cooperative behavior. The common assumption of models of charitable giving is that donors make their contributions simultaneously, with the charity playing a purely passive role. Typically, however, campaigns are guided and directed by fundraisers - often very active ones. The work in the first part of the proposal extends the models of giving to account for this fact. In particular, the work will consider whether herding or a concern for status may be reasons why contributions are announced. Another frequently used strategy is for the fundraiser to set thresholds or goals for the combined contributions to the charity, we will also investigate the implications of such a strategy. The second part of the proposal relaxes the standard assumption that there only is one charity. Allowing for multiple charities I first determine if as predicted aggregate contributions increase when a heterogeneous set of charities are available, and then whether free-riding behavior may be more or less prominent when donors contribute to different and overlapping public goods. Finally, the work in the third part of the proposal studies cooperative behavior. In particular we examine the extent to which learning, reciprocity, and end-game effects can explain the observation that cooperation decreases with time. We also examine what kinds of institutions do the most to encourage cooperation.