Doctoral Dissertation Research: Testing a Status Theory of Collection Action

“集体行动问题”描述的是类似筹款活动和慈善机构的情况，在这些情况下，所有团体成员都选择“搭便车”他人的捐款，而不为公共利益做出贡献，从而获得更多利润。然而，如果所有人的行为都是为了自己的物质利益，那么就不会产生公共产品，每个人的情况都会更糟。我正在研究这个困境，部分原因是它提出了一个基本的社会问题：“为什么是社会？”当个人可以通过不为群体努力做出贡献而获得更多利益时，他们为什么要聚集在一起？我计划测试一个理论，其中地位，一个人在一个群体中基于声望、荣誉和尊重的地位，是集体行动贡献的激励因素。集体行动的地位理论认为：1)个人对集体行动的贡献部分是为了在群体中获得地位，因为受到他人的高度重视是一种有价值的奖励；2)贡献通过增加个人的明显群体动机来提高个人在群体中的地位；3)群体成员在不经历成本的情况下调整他们对彼此地位的印象。4)随着贡献成本的增加，地位奖励也会增加，因为自我牺牲行为是高群体动机的证据。拟议的研究还挑战了传统的理性选择假设，即对集体行动作出贡献的激励必须是物质的，并按成本管理。两个拟议的实验室实验验证了从该理论正式推导出来的假设。研究结果将在专业会议上提出。该项目更广泛的影响包括培训几名本科生研究助理，开发将用作教学工具的软件，以及支持大学的研究生课程。此外，民主的代表性取决于利益集团的集体行动的成功；成功的动员对于改善传统上代表性不足的少数群体的状况尤其重要。为此，拟议的研究提出了在实验室之外动员集体行动的新策略，这些策略可以从理论中推断出来，并为一些现有策略提供了理论解释。

The "collective action problem" describes situations like those found in fund-raising drives and charities where all group members profit more by withholding contribution to the public good, opting instead to "free-ride" on the contributions of others. If all act in their material self-interest, however, no public goods are produced and everyone is worse off. I am investigating this dilemma in part because it poses the fundamental social question of "Why society?" Why do individuals come together in groups when they can profit more by not contributing to group endeavors while still taking their share of the public good? I plan to test a theory wherein status, an individual's standing in a group based on prestige, honor, and deference, serves as an incentive for collective action contributions. The status theory of collective action asserts that 1) Individuals contribute to collective action in part to gain status in the group because being held in high regard by others is a valued reward, 2) Contribution improves an individual's status standing in the group by increasing her apparent group motivation, 3) Group members adjust their impressions of each other's status standing without experiencing costs, 4) As the costs of contribution increase so do status rewards since self-sacrificing behavior is evidence of high group motivation. The proposed research also challenges traditional rational choice assumptions that incentives for contributions to collective action must be material and administered at cost. Two proposed laboratory experiments test hypotheses formally derived from the theory. Results of the studies will be presented at professional meetings. The broader impacts of the project include the training of several undergraduate research assistants, development of software that will be used as a teaching instrument, and support for the University's graduate program. Further, the representativeness of a democracy is contingent on collective action success by interest groups; successful mobilization is especially critical for the improvement of the conditions of traditionally underrepresented minorities. To that end, the proposed research suggests novel strategies for mobilizing collective action outside the laboratory that can be deduced from the theory and provides theoretical explanations of some existing strategies.