Doctoral Dissertation Research in Economics: An Experimental Study of Imperfect Information and Buyer Search with Differentiated Products

我们使用实验方法来检验在差异化商品环境中昂贵信息对企业定价策略的影响。这种差异化商品设置的基本潜在特征是，消费者关心的不仅仅是找到尽可能低的价格；他们还会考虑产品属性与他们口味的匹配程度，从而搜索具有最佳价格匹配组合的产品。实验设计是围绕Anderson和Renault（2000）的理论框架构建的。他们的模型得出了不同的价格和福利预测，这取决于传递给消费者的信息是与价格有关还是与产品属性有关。例如，提供价格信息会降低均衡价格，而提供有关产品特性的信息会减少消费者的搜索并提高价格。事实上，当消费者获得匹配信息时，其价格高于他们根本没有获得信息时的价格。这与一个被广泛接受的经济理论命题形成鲜明对比，即信息的改善会导致价格的降低，从而为消费者创造正外部性。此外，信息的时机也很重要。当消费者在进行昂贵的搜索之前被告知两家公司的匹配值时，价格是最高的。这是因为知情的消费者首先访问他们匹配价值更大的公司，从而降低了需求的非弹性。本论文研究项目将使用经济实验来更好地理解零售价格信息如何影响只有少数卖家的市场结果。研究者将采用与传统零售交易环境非常相似的要约交易机构进行双寡头垄断实验。将比较四种不同的信息环境。无信息处理（NI）形成了一个基线，其他两组处理可以与之比较。在价格信息（PI）和匹配信息（MI）处理中，当所有消费者都搜索了其中一家公司后，其中一半的人会毫无成本地了解到另一家公司的价格或匹配值。比较这两种处理方法可以深入了解信息的内容如何影响公司的定价策略。信息时机的影响是通过比较匹配信息（MI）处理和搜索前匹配信息（PMI）处理来衡量的，其中一半的消费者在搜索前从两个公司都知道他们的匹配值。这一实验设计将提高我们对零售市场交易机制的理解，零售市场交易经常受到信息不对称的困扰，从而为更合理的政策选择提供基础。例如，联邦贸易委员会制定的各种旨在遏制“不完全信息”危害的消费者保护条例，应该考虑到信息不完全的性质和市场影响，而不仅仅是信息不完全的存在。

We use experimental methods to examine the impact of costly information on firms' pricing strategies in a differentiated goods environment. The basic underlying feature of this differentiated goods setup is that consumers care about more than just finding the lowest possible price; they also consider how well the product attributes match their tastes and therefore search for a product with the best price-match combination. The experimental design is structured around Anderson and Renault's (2000) theoretical framework. Their model yields different price and welfare predictions depending on whether the information imparted to the consumer relates to price or product attributes. For instance, providing price information decreases the equilibrium price, while providing information about product characteristics curtails consumer search and raises the price. In fact, the price when consumers are match informed is greater than when they receive no information at all. This is in sharp contrast to a widely accepted proposition of economic theory that improved information leads to lower prices, thereby creating a positive externality for the consumers. Additionally, the timing of information also matters. The price is greatest when consumers are informed about the match values from both firms prior to engaging in costly search. This occurs because informed consumers first visit the firm from which their match value is greater and consequently decrease the demand inelasticity. This dissertation research project will use economic experiments to better understand how information about retail prices affects outcomes in markets where there are only a small number of sellers. The researcher will conduct duopoly experiments employing the posted offer trading institution, which closely resembles the conventional retail trading environments. Four different information environments will be compared. The No-Information treatment (NI) forms a baseline to which two other sets of treatments are compared. In the Price Information (PI) and the Match Information (MI) treatments, after all consumers have searched one of the firms, half of them become costlessly informed about the price or their match values from the second firm. Comparing these two treatments provides insight on how the content of information affects firms' pricing strategies. The impact of the timing of information is measured by comparing the Match information (MI) treatment with the pre-search Match information (PMI) treatment, in which half of the consumers know their match values from both firms before searching. This experimental design will improve our understanding of the mechanisms at work in retail market transactions, which are often plagued by informational asymmetries, and thereby provide a basis for sounder policy choices. For instance, various consumer protection regulations stipulated by the Federal Trade Commission that are aimed towards curbing the harms of "imperfect information" should take into account the nature and market impact of the informational imperfection, and not just its mere existence.