Survivable Trust for Critical Infrastructure

本研究将探讨一个点对点网路的设计，建立在安全的协处理器。该网络名为马里亚纳群岛，将被设计为在互联网基础设施遭受网络攻击时具有一定程度的弹性。 安全协处理和对等技术的结合将创建一个分布式的可生存的可信骨干，使关键基础设施的功能，迄今为止还不存在。 Marianas节点对于许多应用程序来说必须是高度可信的。安全协处理器的内核必须确保应用程序不会相互干扰。在路由基础设施遭受网络攻击期间，马里亚纳必须保持连接。将开发满足不同用户、应用程序和信任要求的认证基础设施，这些问题的解决方案将借鉴安全执行、PKI、安全系统和网络系统评估技术。 为了证明这些概念，中间件将开发编码的候选人的解决方案，并将安装在一个小规模的马里亚纳系统。 更大的马里亚纳系统，可以支持关键的基础设施系统，将被模拟，以评估其性能，并在面对网络攻击的弹性。

This research will investigate the design of a peer-to-peer network built around secure coprocessors. The network, named Marianas, will be designed to have a level of resiliency in the event of cyberattack on the Internet infrastructure. The combination of secure coprocessing and peer-to-peer technologies will create a distributed survivable trustworthy backbone which enables functionality for critical infrastructure that hitherto did not exist. A Marianas node must be highly trustworthy for many applications. The secure coprocessor's kernel must ensure that applications do not interfere with each other. Marianas must remain connected during a network cyberattack on the routing infrastructure. Authentication infrastructure for diverse user, application, and trust requirements will be developed.The solutions to these problems will draw on technologies for secure execution, PKI, secure systems, and networking systems evaluation. To prove these concepts, middle-ware will be developed that encodes the candidate solutions and will be installed on a small scale Marianas system. Much larger Marianas systems, which could support critical infrastructure systems, will be simulated to evaluate their performance, and resiliency in the face of network attack.