Productivity Risk and Employment Risk Over the Life Cycle

摘要Prop ID： SES-0453119P I： Pistaferri，Luigi组织： 斯坦福大学 生命周期中的生产率风险和就业风险家庭支出是经济繁荣和衰退背后的驱动力。 因此，了解消费的决定因素至关重要。这项建议将着眼于劳动力市场风险对家庭消费和储蓄的影响。认为生活在风险时期的消费者可能会谨慎行事，推迟支出;他们也可能通过延长工作时间来应对风险。因此，风险的总体影响和福利影响可能是巨大的。更具体地说，该提案明确了劳动者在劳动力市场上面临的各种风险之间的区别。它区分了生产率风险和失业风险。这种区别往往没有得到很好的理解。生产率风险是个体特有的不确定性，无论雇主的特征如何都存在。例如，健康冲击会影响个人生产力，从而影响各种工作的工资。失业风险反映的是就业的不确定性。这包括公司破产的可能性、被解雇的风险以及失业时得不到工作机会的风险。此外，如果不同的企业支付不同的工资，失业风险将被企业异质性放大，因为失业工人可能会拒绝差企业的报价，失业时间更长。 该提案还旨在使用单个面板数据量化生产率风险和失业风险的程度。这两种风险的正确识别关键取决于人们对工人所面临的经济环境的假设。简单的模型可能会导致关于这两种风险的定量重要性的错误推断。例如，假设一个人做出标准假设，即工作机会是肯定会收到的，所有公司提供的工资都是一样的。在这种情况下，不会有失业风险，因为失业完全是自愿的。为了区分生产率风险和失业风险，作者提出了一个考虑储蓄、内生劳动力市场参与和企业内部流动性的模型。他还考虑了政府保险计划，如失业和残疾保险，以及食品券计划，因此通过参与和储蓄的变化，对政府保险的行为反应建立在他的模型中。我们提议的做法可能会产生重要影响。在制定公共政策时，必须了解哪些风险是重要的。 通过对代理人面临的风险进行定量评估，可以利用经济学理论指导最优社会保险安排的构建。更广泛的影响：一旦确定了各种风险来源，就可以模拟个人储蓄行为，并衡量各种风险的福利成本。这些模拟表明了预防性行为的程度（预防性储蓄和预防性劳动力供应）。他们还提出了一些可以解决的问题：个人愿意支付多少钱来避免各种风险？ 有多少预防性反应是由于失业风险，有多少是由于生产率风险。 调查人员计划评估现有政府保险计划的福利待遇，以及拟议的改革和替代计划的福利待遇。

ABSTRACTProp ID: SES-0453119P I: Pistaferri, Luigi Organization: Stanford University Title: Productivity Risk and Employment Risk Over the Life Cycle Household spending is the driving force behind economic booms and recessions. Understanding the determinants of consumption is therefore of utmost importance. This proposal will look at the effect of labor market risks on household consumption and saving. Consumers who perceive to live in risky times may behave cautiously and defer spending; they may also respond to risk by working longer hours. The aggregate and welfare effects of risk may therefore be substantial.More specifically, the proposal clarifies the distinction between the various kinds of risks that workers face in the labor market. It distinguishes between productivity risk and unemployment risk. This distinction is often not well understood. Productivity risk is individual-specific uncertainty that exists regardless of the employer's characteristics. For example, health shocks affect individual productivity and hence wages in all kinds of jobs. Unemployment risk captures instead the uncertainty about having a job. This includes the possibility of firm bankruptcy, the risk of being laid off and that of not receiving offers while unemployed. Moreover, if different firms pay different wages, unemployment risk will be magnified by firm heterogeneity, because unemployed workers may reject offers from bad firms and stay unemployed longer. The proposal also aims at quantifying the extent of productivity risk and unemployment risk using individual panel data. Correct identification of the two risks depends crucially on the assumptions one makes about the economic environment confronted by workers. Simple models may lead to wrong inference concerning the quantitative importance of the two risks. For example, suppose one makes the standard assumptions that job offers are received with certainty and all firms offer the same wage. In this case there will be no unemployment risk as such because unemployment would be entirely voluntary. To make the distinction between productivity risk and unemployment risk meaningful the author proposes a model with saving and endogenous labor market participation and intra-firm mobility. He also allows for government insurance programs such as unemployment and disability insurance, and the Food Stamp programs, so that behavioral responses to government insurance are built in his model through changes in participation and changes in savings. The exercise we propose may have important implications. When formulating public policy it is imperative to have an idea of what risks matter. With a quantitative assessment of the risks facing agents it is possible to use economic theory to guide the construction of optimal social insurance arrangements.Broader impacts: Once the various sources of risk have been identified, one can simulate individual saving behavior and measure the welfare costs of the various risks. These simulations give an indication of the extent of precautionary behavior (both precautionary saving and precautionary labor supply). They also raise a number of questions that can be addressed: How much would individuals be willing to pay to avoid the various risks? How much of the precautionary response is due to unemployment risk and how much to productivity risk. The investigator plans to evaluate the welfare benefits of existing government insurance programs, as well as those of proposed reforms and of alternative programs.