Doctoral Dissertation Research in Political Science: Intra-Party Bargaining, Electoral Rules, and Distributive Politics in Parliamentary Democracies

这个项目寻求资金来解释议会民主政体中分配政策的两种不同类型。第一个问题涉及总支出的平衡，一方面是惠及更广泛公民基础的公共产品型政策，另一方面是针对社会狭小阶层的特殊的猪肉桶型政策。如何解释议会民主制度下公共产品和特殊项目之间总支出余额的跨国差异？第二种类型的变化是如何在选区之间分配分配方案，这些选区是大多数民主国家政治代表的主要基础。在分配方案的地理分配模式上，预计会有任何跨国差异吗？如果是这样的话，这些差异的原因是什么？关于公共产品和特殊项目之间的平衡，文献中的流行描述将选举规则的差异作为一个关键的解释变量。然而，尽管选举规则的差异可能是最重要的因素之一，但它应该是塑造立法者激励机制的众多因素中唯一的一个。只关注选举规则的不同，可能遗漏了他们的激励措施中的重要变化。关于跨选区分配方案的分配，现有文献缺乏对跨区分配模式的跨国差异的具体预测。为了克服这些限制，这个项目提出了一个理论解释，重点放在故事中迄今被忽视的一个方面，即议会民主国家执政党领导人和后座议员之间的党内讨价还价。关于公共产品和分配方案之间的总体平衡，这一理论预测，如果执政党现任议员的选举命运与其政党整体的命运更(不)紧密地结合在一起，那么公共产品(特殊方案)的预算分配就会增加。本文的主要创新点之一是估计了来自不同选举制度的政府政党现任议员的选举命运的凝聚力，并将其作为一个关键解释变量，用大约20个先进工业民主国家的时间序列横截面数据来验证假设。关于各区分配方案的分配，同样的理论预测，边缘地区在没有区级党内选举竞争的选举制度下获得更多分配方案，而拥有强大/资深议员的地区在有党内竞争的选举制度下获得更多分配方案。通过这些理论和实证研究，这个项目有助于更好地理解议会民主下的分配政治，议会民主是先进工业社会的一种主要民主形式，也是年轻民主国家的流行选择。

This project seeks funding to explain two types of variation in distributive policies in the parliamentary democracies. The first concerns the balance in the aggregate spending between the public goods type policies that benefit a broader citizen base, and the particularistic, pork-barrel type policies that target narrow segments of the society. What explains the cross-country variation in the aggregate spending balance between the public goods and the particularistic programs under parliamentary democracies? The second type of variation is how distributive programs are allocated across electoral districts, the primary bases of political representation in most democracies. Are any cross-country differences expected in the pattern of geographical allocation of distributive programs? If so, what accounts for these differences? On the balance between public goods and particularistic programs, popular accounts in the literature focus on the difference in electoral rules as a key explanatory variable. However, while the difference in electoral rules may be among the most important factors, it should be yet the only one of many factors that shape incentives of the legislators. The exclusive focus on the difference in electoral rules might have missed important variations in their incentives. On the allocation of distributive programs across electoral districts, the existing literature lacks in the specific predictions of the cross-country difference in the pattern of allocation across districts. To overcome these limitations, this project proposes a theoretical account focusing on so far a neglected aspect of the story, intra-party bargaining between party leaders and backbench legislators of the governing party(ies) in parliamentary democracies. On the aggregate balance between public goods and distributive programs, this theory predicts that the allocation of budget to public goods (particularistic programs) increases if the electoral fate of incumbent legislators of the governing party(ies) is more (less) cohesive with the fate of their party as a whole. One of the major innovations of this paper is the estimation of the cohesion of the electoral fate of incumbents from government parties across different electoral systems and the use of it as a key explanatory variable to test the hypothesis with the time-series-cross-section data of about twenty advanced industrial democracies. On the allocation of distributive programs across districts, the same theory predicts that marginal districts receive more distributive programs under the electoral systems without intra-party electoral competition at district level while districts withpowerful/senior legislators receive more distributive programs under the electoral systems with intra-party competition. This hypothesis is tested with a data from Japan which has experienced the change of electoral systems from those with intra-party competition to those without.Through these theoretical and empirical investigations, this project contributes to a betterunderstanding of distributive politics under the parliamentary democracy, a predominant form of democracy among advanced industrial societies and a popular option among young democracies.