Doctoral Dissertation Research: Exit Power, Coalition Negotiations, and Multiparty Governance

摘要：退出权力、联盟谈判与多党执政迈科·伊莎贝尔·海勒总论为什么在多党议会制中，一些初级联盟成员会从伙伴那里得到比其他成员更大的让步？议会联盟通常由一个控制至少多个议会席位的资深伙伴和一个或多个控制其余席位的初级伙伴组成。在这个项目中，研究人员认为，如果初级合伙人能够可信地威胁退出政府的联盟，他们就拥有显著的讨价还价能力。只有当他们能够进入至少一个可能组建并对他们有吸引力的其他政府时，他们才能做到这一点。很简单，这些小联盟离开的可信威胁越大，他们对政府政策的影响力就越大。这个项目的贡献在于提出了这样一种观点，即可信的退出威胁是讨价还价的一个重要来源，而不是政策。这项事业的一个关键部分是创造一种新的退出权力措施。通过考察谁在联合政府中掌握着退出权力，它不仅在解释为什么一些政府比另一些政府支出更多方面发挥了关键作用，而且在解释如何支出的选择方面也发挥了关键作用。同样，这种退出权力形式也有助于解释哪些政党比其他联盟成员获得更多基于党派的福利，如内阁职位。此外，为这一项目收集的基于访谈的新颖数据增强了我们对议会民主国家联盟谈判和组建过程的理解。反过来，这将为政治学研究的重要领域提供更多洞察力，包括政策制定和民主代表。技术摘要在这个项目中，作者假设，初级联盟成员在议会政府中的议价能力取决于他们威胁退出联盟的可信度，研究人员称之为退出威胁。因此，初级合伙人获得让步的能力随着他们相对退出能力的增加而增加。研究人员创建了一种新的退出权力衡量标准，根据每个替代联合党可能加入的可能性，以及这个替代政府联盟对该党的意识形态吸引力来得出。退出权力变化的一个重要后果是对政府支出的影响。研究发现，只有在最强大的政党几乎没有退出权力的情况下，支出才会随着联合党数量的增加而增加。然而，当一个政党的相对议价能力增加时，支出也会增加。同样，当该党拥有重要的退出权力时，支出类型更能反映该党的偏好。例如，当右翼政党拥有更大程度的退出点时，国家安全支出往往会增加，环境支出往往会减少。为了进一步调查这些问题，研究人员对来自多个议会民主国家的前政党官员进行了一系列非结构化的精英访谈。该党官员包括扩大的党的领导层、内阁部长和国会议员。这些面谈对于确定拟议的因果机制的存在和合理性至关重要。此外，这类采访还增加了我们对联合政府谈判过程和各方愿意进行的权衡的了解。最后，它们提供了关于为什么政党认为某些内阁职位比其他职位更具吸引力的见解，这是对为什么一些政党获得更多、更具吸引力的内阁组合的量化分析的补充。

Abstract: Exit Power, Coalition Negotiations, and Multiparty GovernanceMaiko Isabelle HellerGeneral Abstract Why do some junior coalition members in multi-party parliamentary systems receive greater concessions from their partners than others? Parliamentary coalitions generally consist of a senior partner that controls at least a plurality of parliamentary seats, and one or more junior partners that control the remainder. In this project, the researcher contend that junior partners possess significant bargaining if they can credibly threaten to pull out of the government's coalition. They can only do so if they can enter at least one other government that is likely to form and attractive to them. Quite simply, the greater the credible threat for these junior coalition to leave, the more influence over government policies they possess. The contribution of this project lies in the introduction of the argument that credible exit threats as a significant source of bargaining leverage over policy. A key part of this enterprise is the creation of a new measure of exit power. By examining who holds exit power in a coalition government, plays a key role in explaining not only why some governments spend more than others, but also the choices on how to spend. Likewise, this form of exit power also helps to explain which parties some receive more party-based benefits such as cabinet posts than other coalitions member. Moreover, the novel interview-based data collected for this project enhances our understanding of the coalition negotiation and formation process in parliamentary democracies. This, in turn, will provide greater insights into important areas of political science research, including policy making and democratic representation. Technical Abstract In this project, the author posit that the bargaining power of junior coalition members in parliamentary governments is determined by the credibility of their threat to leave the coalition, what the researcher calls exit threat. As such, the ability of junior partners to extract concessions increases as their relative exit power increases. The researcher creates a new measure of exit power derived from the likelihood of formation of each alternative coalition party could enter, in conjunction with the ideological attractiveness of this alternate government coalition for the party. One important consequence of changes in exit power is the effect on government spending. The study finds that spending only increases with increases in the number of coalition parties to the extent that the strongest party possesses little exit power. As a party's relative bargaining power increase, however, spending also increases. Likewise, the type of spending reflects the preferences of that party more when it holds significant exit power. For instance, national security spending tends to increase and environmental spending tends to decreases when right-wing parties possess greater levels of exit point. To investigate these questions further, the researcher conducted a series of unstructured elite interviews with former party officials from a number of parliamentary democracies. Party officials include the extended party leadership, cabinet ministers, and members of parliament. These interviews are crucial to establishing the existence and plausibility of the proposed causal mechanism. Additionally, interviews of this sort also increase our understanding of the coalition negotiation process and the trade-offs parties are willing to make. Finally, they provide insights as to why parties find certain cabinet posts more attractive than others, which complements quantitative analyses on why some parties receive more, and more attractive, cabinet portfolios.