EITM: Electoral and Party Systemic Institutions, Structure, and Strategic Context: Empirical Implications of Theoretical Models of Effective Democratic Representation.

EITM：选举和政党的系统性制度、结构和战略背景：有效民主代表理论模型的实证意义。

• 批准号: 0340195
• 负责人: Robert Franzese
• 金额: --
• 依托单位: Regents of the University of Michigan - Ann Arbor
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2004
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2004-05-01 至 2010-04-30
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=0340195&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: EITM; Electoral; Party; Systemic; Institutions

Political-economy theories note that policymakers have two goals: (a) to obtain and retain power (office seeking) and (b) to enact policies and foster outcomes they favor (policy and outcome seeking). In stable polities (i.e., excluding coercion), policymakers have four broad classes of policy they can direct toward these goals: public-good provision, broadly targeted redistribution, narrowly targeted distribution, and rent extraction. In democracies, finally, policymaking representatives use these tools to pursue these goals in the strategic context of partisan electoral competition.Substantively, this project will leverage and advance theories of comparative democracy and of comparative and international political economy to build powerful, estimable, and interpretable empirical models that directly, but manageably, reflect the multifarious and complex interactions of electoral institutions, of party and party-systemic structure, and of the strategic shape of particular partisan-electoral contests in determining the relative weight of these four classes of policy in policymaking output. Party- and electoral-system institutions, structure, and strategic context interact in quite complex ways to shape the effective representation of societal interests in the ultimate policies, but, as this project seeks to demonstrate, in ways that a nonlinear empirical-modeling strategy can encompass effectively. One venue where the effects of such complex contextual interactions in shaping effective representation should be more-observable is in the composition of policymaking activity, particularly in the redistributive (broadly targeted) versus distributive (narrowly targeted) share of budgetary activity. Institutional, structural, and strategic contexts that induce more partisan, interest-based representation foster greater redistributive emphasis, and those that induce more particularistic, geographically-based representation favor distribution. I have begun to outline such a comparative democratic political economy of budgeteering more fully elsewhere, arguing: (i) that the degree to which parties are able to act as strategic units (strategic party-unity) should determine the capacity of democratic policymakers to budgeteer, i.e., to manipulate the budget for political (i.e., electoral and partisan) purposes, (ii) that national and district-level electoral competitiveness should determine the magnitude of their incentives to budgeteer, and (iii) party-system polarization, electoral-system and district magnitude, and the degree to which parties receive their electoral support as units (representational party-unity) should determine the nature of the budgeteering that serves policymakers goals of gaining and retaining power and of producing their desired policies and outcomes. The combination of capacity and incentive size and nature, therefore, should determine the degree and character of the budgeteering I have also begun to outline an estimable nonlinear empirical model that could shed light on the multiple, complex interactions among these many causal factors in shaping fiscal policies. In this theoretical description of a substantive situation, (i) strategic capacity, c, times (ii) incentive magnitude, m, determines the amount of budgeteering we expect, while (iii) the nature, n, of the budgeteering that we expect in pursuing these goals depends on several party, party-system, and electoral-system factors that shape whether effective representation has more partisan-interest or particularistic-geographic basis and so whether policy has more redistributive or distributive nature. Thus, taking (for now) the ratio of redistributive to distributive budgetary activity, R, as the dependent variable, theory predicts that R=-+c(Xc)m(Xm)n(Xn)+-, and empirical models should reflect that proposition (EITM). In previous work, I showed how nonlinear empirical modeling can gain powerful yet interpretable leverage on the multiple, complex interactions implied by such specifications to the degrees that theory enables specification of the functions and their arguments, c(Xc), m(Xm), and n(Xn), and that these functions and/or arguments differ empirically in the empirical sample. I have so far begun to specify c(Xc), m(Xm), and n(Xn) in this new context as (i)-(iii) of the previous paragraph sketch, and I have demonstrated preliminary empirical plausibility and found some hope for empirical success by showing a role of partisan strategic capacity in shaping the relative (re)distributiveness of postwar US fiscal policy that supports the theory and showing a pattern of coefficients on partisan- and geographic-representation independent variables in explaining thepolicy mix in subsamples of developed democracies divided according to my own qualitative evaluation of conditions (i)-(iii) in those countries. This proposal would fund continuance of this project: (a) specifying further and in tighter connection to comparative-politics and comparative political-economy theories, c(Xc), m(Xm), and n(Xn), (b) gathering, operationalizing appropriately, and disseminating the data components of R, Xc, Xm, and Xn, (c) writing and disseminating the necessary software algorithms to estimate such models, and (d) estimating such models, and disseminating the theoretical, substantive, and methodological advances produced thereby.The intellectual merit lies both in advancing and demonstrating an inEITMlr modeling technique for bringing theory that previously evaded empirical evaluation due to its interactive complexity under direct empirical scrutiny and in whatever substantively and theoretically new light is thus shed. Given that complex multiple interaction is inherent in most classical and modern political economy and, indeed, political theory, empirical techniques that offer powerful, estimable, and interpretable leverage on such complexity are crucial. This particular approach should offer much promise for usefulness across the social sciences, where such complexly interactive causality is rife. The research project will also involve the next generation in these advances directly through RA-ships It also seeks to broaden their use in this and subsequent generations through the public provision of transparent software tools to implement such nonlinear modeling.

政治经济学理论指出，决策者有两个目标：(a)获得并保持权力（寻求职位）；(b)制定政策并促进他们喜欢的结果（政策和结果寻求）。在稳定的政策中（即排除强制），政策制定者有四大类政策可以指导他们实现这些目标：公共产品提供、广泛目标的再分配、狭隘目标的分配和租金提取。最后，在民主国家，决策代表在党派选举竞争的战略背景下使用这些工具来实现这些目标。从本质上讲，该项目将利用和推进比较民主理论以及比较和国际政治经济学理论，以建立强大的、可估计的、可解释的经验模型，这些模型直接、但易于管理地反映选举机构、政党和政党系统结构之间各种复杂的相互作用，以及特定党派选举竞争在决定这四类政策在政策制定产出中的相对权重方面的战略形态。政党和选举制度的机构、结构和战略背景以相当复杂的方式相互作用，以塑造最终政策中社会利益的有效代表，但是，正如本项目试图证明的那样，非线性经验建模策略可以有效地涵盖这些方式。这种复杂的背景相互作用在形成有效代表权方面的影响应该更容易观察到的一个方面是决策活动的组成，特别是在预算活动的再分配（广泛目标）与分配（狭隘目标）份额方面。制度、结构和战略背景促使更多的党派、基于利益的代表促进更大的再分配强调，而那些诱导更多的特殊的、基于地理的代表有利于分配。我已经开始在其他地方更全面地概述这种预算编制的相对民主政治经济学，我认为：(i)政党能够作为战略单位（战略政党团结）的程度应决定民主政策制定者对预算编制者的能力，即为政治（即选举和党派）目的操纵预算的能力，（ii）国家和地区一级的选举竞争力应决定其对预算编制者的激励程度，以及（iii）政党制度极化，选举制度和地区规模，政党作为一个单位获得选举支持的程度（代表政党的团结）应该决定预算编制的性质，这种预算编制服务于决策者获得和保留权力的目标，并产生他们想要的政策和结果。因此，能力和激励规模和性质的结合应该决定预算编制的程度和特征。我还开始概述一个可估计的非线性经验模型，该模型可以揭示在形成财政政策的许多因果因素之间的多种复杂相互作用。在这种对实质性情况的理论描述中，(i)战略能力(c)乘以（ii）激励幅度(m)决定了我们期望的预算编制量，而（iii）我们在追求这些目标时期望的预算编制的性质(n)取决于几个政党、政党制度。选举制度的因素决定了有效的代表权是基于党派利益还是基于特定的地域基础，从而决定了政策是具有再分配还是分配的性质。因此，以（目前）再分配预算活动与分配预算活动的比率R作为因变量，理论预测R=-+c(Xc)m(Xm)n(Xn)+-，经验模型应反映该命题（EITM）。在之前的工作中，我展示了非线性经验建模如何在这些规范所隐含的多重复杂相互作用上获得强大而可解释的杠杆作用，以至于理论能够规范函数及其参数c(Xc), m（Xm）和n(Xn)，并且这些函数和/或参数在经验样本中具有经验差异。到目前为止，我已经开始在这个新的上下文中指定c(Xc), m（Xm）和n（Xn）作为上一段草图的(I)-(iii)。通过展示党派战略能力在塑造战后美国财政政策的相对（再）分配方面的作用（支持该理论），以及展示党派和地理代表性自变量的系数模式，在解释发达民主国家子样本中的政策组合时，我已经证明了初步的实证合理性，并发现了一些实证成功的希望这些国家。这项建议将为该项目的继续提供资金：(a)进一步明确与比较政治学和比较政治经济学理论，c(Xc), m（Xm）和n（Xn）的紧密联系，(b)收集，适当地操作和传播R， Xc， Xm和Xn的数据组成部分，(c)编写和传播必要的软件算法来估计这些模型，(d)估计这些模型，并传播由此产生的理论，实质性和方法上的进步。智力上的优点在于推进和展示了一种inEITMlr建模技术，该技术将以前由于其相互作用的复杂性而逃避经验评估的理论置于直接的经验审查之下，并在任何实质性和理论上的新曙光由此而产生。考虑到复杂的多重互动是大多数古典和现代政治经济学以及政治理论所固有的，在这种复杂性上提供强大的、可估计的和可解释的杠杆的经验技术是至关重要的。这种特殊的方法应该会在社会科学中提供很多有用的希望，在社会科学中，这种复杂的相互作用的因果关系很普遍。该研究项目还将通过ra船直接涉及下一代，它还寻求通过公开提供透明的软件工具来实现这种非线性建模，从而扩大它们在这一代和后代中的使用。